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INTRODUCTION 
 
Over one year ago, we suggested in the pages of this review that the 
United States Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Brockamp1 and 
United States v. Beggerly2 cast doubt on the view among federal courts that 
the limitations periods of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) could be 
equitably tolled.3  Equitable tolling extends a limitations period if a filing 
deadline passes due to a defendant’s misconduct or a diligent plaintiff’s 
failure to file a proper pleading in the correct forum.4  Since the Supreme 
Court decided Brockamp  and Beggerly, courts have clung to the view that 
equitable tolling is proper in FTCA cases.  In doing so, some courts have 
ignored Brockamp  and Beggerly altogether.5 Other courts have 
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 1  519 U.S. 347 (1997). 
 2  524 U.S. 38 (1998). 
 3 See Richard Parker & Ugo Colella, Revisiting Equitable Tolling and the Federal Tort 
Claims Act: The Impact of Brockamp and Beggerly, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 885 (1999); 
see also Richard Parker, Is the Doctrine of Equitable Tolling Applicable to the Limitations 
Periods in the Federal Tort Claims Act?, 135 M IL. L. REV. 1 (1992) (arguing that history 
and purpose of FTCA’s statute of limitations precludes equitable tolling). 
 4 See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990). 
 5 See Barr v. United States, No. 98-7164 1999, WL 314634, at *1 (10th Cir. May 19, 
1999) (table); Wartell v. United States, No. 96-16547, 1997 WL 59980, at *3 (9th Cir. Sept. 
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distinguished the FTCA from the statutes at issue in those two cases,6 have 
found unpersuasive certain portions of the legislative history,7 or have 
found other reasons to permit equitable tolling.8 
In light of these recent developments, the Seton Hall Law Review has 
been gracious enough to allow us to explain in greater depth whether the 
FTCA’s legislative history sheds any light on the question of whether the 
limitations periods in the Act may be equitably tolled, a point that perhaps 
deserved further elaboration the first time around.  Unfortunately, in our 
1999 paper we relegated much of the legislative history to a footnote.9  We 
simply pointed out that, prior to enacting the FTCA in 1946, Congress 
considered legislative proposals that contained equitable tolling provisions, 
but that when Congress finally enacted the FTCA, it declined to include 
those provisions.10  To us, this pre-enactment history meant that the 1946 
Congress did not intend equitable tolling to apply, especially because the 
Supreme Court endorsed this method of construing the intent behind the 
FTCA.11  We also examined the legislative history accompanying the 1949 
and 1966 changes to the Act’s statute of limitations and argued that this 
history, combined with the pre-enactment history, indicated a congressional 
intent to preclude equitable tolling.12 
 
19, 1997) (table); Hudson v. United States Postal Serv., Nos. C 99-5117 WHA, C 00-0093 
WHA, 2000 WL 23678, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2000); St. John v. United States, 54 F. 
Supp. 2d 1322, 1326-27 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Yillah v. United States, No. Civ.A. 98-2842, 1998 
WL 661545, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 1998); Berlin v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 2d 648, 653 
(S.D. W.Va. 1997); Magdalenski v. United States, 977 F. Supp. 66, 71 (D. Mass 1997); 
Midland Psychiatric Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 543, 553 (W.D. Mo. 1997); 
Hyatt v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 96, 100-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 6 See Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913, 917 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that two-year 
period may be equitably tolled because FTCA not as complex as statute in Brockamp); 
Forman v. United States, No. Civ. A. 98-6784, 1999 WL 793429, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 
1999) (holding that six-month limitations period may be equitably tolled because, among 
other reasons, the Brockamp Court “said that the more complex the limitations period, the 
less likely equitable tolling is permissible”). 
 7 See Stanfill v. United States, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1308 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (holding 
that six-month period may be equitably tolled because legislative history provided “scant” 
evidence of an intent to preclude equitable tolling); Forman, 1999 WL 793429, at *8 & n.11 
(stating that neither Beggerly nor Brockamp considered legislative history in reaching their 
conclusions); see also Perez, 167 F.3d at 916 (holding that two-year period may be 
equitably tolled because legislative-history evidence to the contrary was, among other 
things, “equivocal”). 
 8 See Forman, 1999 WL 793429, at *8-*10 (holding that six-month limitations period 
may be equitably tolled because there is no built-in tolling, the period is “short,” the “nature 
of tort law suggests that equitable considerations are proper under the FTCA,” and applying 
equitable tolling would not present administrative problems). 
 9 See Parker & Colella, supra note 3, at 907-08 n.111. 
 10 See id. 
 11 See id. at 907 & n.109. 
 12 See id. at 905-14. 
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Courts have not been swayed by the FTCA’s legislative history, 
perhaps because they think it is irrelevant or perhaps because they think it 
is inconclusive.13  These results are not altogether surprising given certain 
normative and practical considerations that arise when legislative history is 
presented as a basis for construing a statute.  From a normative perspective, 
resort to legislative history can be a touchy subject with Article III courts.  
Judges who have textualist leanings would much rather draw their 
conclusions about congressional intent from the plain terms of the statute 
under review.  On the other hand, there are judges who have intentionalist 
leanings who do not become as queasy as textualists when presented with 
arguments based on legislative history¾although intentionalists do insist 
that the legislative evidence rise to a threshold level of reliability.14  From a 
practical perspective, legislative history is not as accessible to courts and 
litigants as are other sources for decision, is often much harder to navigate, 
and requires courts and litigants to absorb and analyze a great deal of 
information.15  Add to this the fact that the FTCA’s legislative history, as it 
pertains to whether equitable tolling was contemplated for the Act’s statute 
of limitations, has never been fleshed out in any great detail. 
In this Article, we defend the use of legislative history in construing 
the FTCA, not because it is “correct” in the normative sense, but because 
long-standing precedent and the unique history of the Act require courts to 
look to the Act’s legislative history to ascertain congressional intent.  In 
Part I, we restate the problem that we addressed in our 1999 paper, pointing 
out that the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Beggerly and Brockamp  
require courts to re-examine the question of whether equitable tolling is 
proper in FTCA cases.  In Part II, we present the answers that a few courts 
have given to the Beggerly-Brockamp  question.  We pay particular 
attention to those courts’ analyses of the FTCA’s legislative history in 
reaching the conclusion that equitable tolling is proper in FTCA cases. 
In Part III, we shift gears a bit and briefly visit the academic debate 
surrounding the use of legislative history in statutory construction.  The 
 
 13 See Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913, 916 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that evidence 
from legislative history is “equivocal”); Stanfill v. United States, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1308 
(M.D. Ala. 1999) (holding that legislative history provided “scant” evidence to rebut the 
presumption favoring equitable tolling); Forman v. United States, No. Civ. A. 98-6784, 
1999 WL 793429, at *8 & n.11 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 1999) (holding that legislative history was 
irrelevant). 
 14 See infra Part III, for a more extended discussion of this issue. 
 15 Justice Scalia has said that resort to legislative history is “a waste of research time 
and ink” and “condemns litigants (who, unlike us, must pay for it out of their own pockets) 
to subsidizing historical research by lawyers.”  Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).  As we shall see, however, Justice Scalia has not been so 
unforgiving when it comes to the equitable tolling question or when it comes to interpreting 
the intent behind the FTCA.  See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text. 
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academic commentary has opened up a number of schools of thought that 
purportedly shed light on the question of whether legislative history should 
be used in statutory construction.  We conclude, however, that as a 
practical matter, there are only two approaches to the legislative history 
problem: Judges either rely upon legislative history (the intentionalists) or 
they do not (the textualists).  We then examine the intentionalist and 
textualist methodologies at work in sovereign immunity cases, with a 
particular emphasis on equitable tolling and FTCA cases.  We conclude 
that the Supreme Court has adopted an intentionalist approach to determine 
whether Congress intended equitable tolling to apply in cases against the 
federal government and that the Court has consistently looked to the 
FTCA’s legislative history for evidence of congressional intent. 
In Part IV, we present the legislative history accompanying the 
FTCA’s statute of limitations and show that Congress, having crafted a 
precise and unambiguous limitations regime in the Act, has assumed the 
task of remedying any inequities produced by the Act’s limitations periods.  
In Part V, we critically examine the few cases that have addressed, or more 
accurately, have failed to address, the FTCA’s legislative history in 
determining whether the Act’s limitations periods may be equitably tolled 
in circumstances not specifically covered by the language of the statute.  
We compare the reasoning in those cases to the legislative history 
accompanying the changes to the Act’s statute of limitations and conclude 
that the few decisions that have attempted to apply the reasoning of 
Beggerly and Brockamp  to the FTCA should not be followed.  Rather, 
Congress’s historical involvement in changing the Act’s statute of 
limitations to account for inequitable circumstances, read in conjunction 
with other indicators of congressional intent detailed in our 1999 paper,16 
suggests that the FTCA’s limitations periods may not be equitably tolled.  
Finally, in Part VI, we comment on what the future may hold and offer 
some thoughts on the broader context within which the equitable tolling 
question must be answered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 See Parker & Colella, supra note 3, at 905-14 (arguing that built-in tolling of the two-
year period and purposes underlying the two-year and six-month limitations period, in 
addition to legislative history, compel the conclusion that equitable tolling is impermissible 
in FTCA cases). 
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I. THE PROBLEM RESTATED 
We start with the basics.  The FTCA is a limited waiver of the United 
States’ historical immunity from tort liability.  It must be strictly 
construed.17  The Act’s statute of limitations provides the following: 
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is 
presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years 
after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months 
after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of 
final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.18 
Thus, the FTCA contains two time limitations with which claimants 
must comply.  The first requires a claimant to file an administrative tort 
claim with the appropriate federal agency within two years from the time 
the claim accrues.19  The second requires a claimant to file suit in federal 
district court within six months after the agency denies, in writing, the 
administrative claim.20  The Supreme Court and lower courts have held that 
the Act’s limitations periods are conditions on Congress’s waiver of the 
United States’ immunity from tort suits, and they are designed to facilitate 
the prompt presentation of tort claims against the United States.21 
The FTCA’s statute of limitations, however, has been changed since 
1946, the year the Act was passed.  The original statute required a claimant 
to file suit in federal district court within one year after the claim accrued, 
and there was no mandatory requirement that a claimant submit a tort claim 
to a federal agency before filing suit.22  However, if a claim was submitted 
to an agency within one year of accrual, the claimant had six months after 
the claim was denied or withdrawn by the claimant to file suit in federal 
court.23  In 1949, the one-year limitations period was extended to two 
 
 17 See United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. United States, 105 F.3d 185, 187 (4th Cir. 1997); 
Hayes v. United States ex rel. United States Dep’t of the Army, 44 F.3d 377, 378 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 814 (1995); Nelson v. United States, 838 F.2d 1280, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 
1988). 
 18 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994). 
 19 See id. 
 20 See id. 
 21 See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979); Johnson v. Smithsonian 
Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 1999); Flory v. United States, 138 F.3d 157, 160 (5th Cir. 
1998); Hart v. Dep’t of Labor ex rel. United States, 116 F.3d 1338, 1341 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Pipkin v. United States Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 272, 275 (10th Cir. 1991)); Arigo v. 
United States, 980 F.2d 1159, 1160 (8th Cir. 1992); Gould v. United States Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., 905 F.2d 738, 742 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1025 
(1991); Braswell v. Flintkote Mines, Ltd., 723 F.2d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
467 U.S. 1231 (1984). 
 22 See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (codified at 40 
U.S.C. §§ 2, 33 & 40 (1986)). 
 23 See id. 
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years, and the six-month limitations period applicable to agency denials 
and claimant withdrawals remained the same.24  In 1966, the statute of 
limitations was changed again to correspond with the administrative-
presentment requirement that Congress added to the Act.25  Under the 1966 
changes, an FTCA claimant had two years after a tort claim accrued to 
submit that claim to the appropriate federal agency for possible 
settlement.26  The administrative-presentment requirement¾which, until 
1966, had not been mandatory¾now became a permanent procedural 
requirement for bringing tort claims against the United States.  To comport 
with this new requirement, Congress provided tort claimants an additional 
six months within which to file suit in federal court after the claim was 
denied by the agency.27  In 1988, Congress created limited exceptions to 
the Act’s statute of limitations in circumstances where the United States is 
substituted as the proper party-defendant in cases involving federal 
employees who were named as improper parties for common law tortious 
acts or omissions arising from the course and scope of their employment.28 
Prior to 1990, courts almost uniformly held that the Act’s two-year 
and six-month limitations periods could not be equitably tolled.29  That 
changed in 1990, with the Supreme Court’s holding in Irwin v. Department 
of Veterans Affairs.30  In Irwin, the Court held that there is a rebuttable 
presumption that limitations periods in waiver-of-sovereign-immunity 
statutes may be equitably tolled.31  Irwin involved Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which imposed a thirty-day limitation period on cases 
brought against private parties and the United States.  Finding no 
congressional indication to the contrary, the Court concluded that because 
equitable tolling is available in suits against private party defendants, it 
would be incongruous to conclude that equitable tolling would be 
unavailable in suits against the United States.32 
 
 24 See H.R. REP. NO. 81-276, at 3 (1949) [hereinafter H.R. REP. NO. 276]; S. REP. NO. 
81-135, at 4 (1949) [hereinafter S. REP.  NO. 135]; H.R. REP.  NO. 80-1754, at 4 (1948) 
[hereinafter H.R. REP. NO. 1754]. 
 25 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 89-1532, at 6-7 (1966) [hereinafter H.R. REP. NO. 1532]; S. 
REP. NO. 89-1327, at 2-3 (1966) [hereinafter S. REP. NO. 1327]. 
 26 See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994). 
 27 See id.  In addition, the claimant could file suit at any time after allowing the agency 
six months to consider the claim, provided that the agency had not granted or denied the 
claim.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1994). 
 28 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2679(d)(5)(A)-(B) (1994).  In our 1999 paper, we did not include 
the equitable tolling provisions of § 2679 in our analysis. 
 29 See Parker & Colella, supra note 3, at 887-88 & n.12 (cases cited therein). 
 30 498 U.S. 89 (1990). 
 31 See id. at 95-96. 
 32 See id. at 95.  Indeed, Irwin should be read together with the Court’s earlier decision 
in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392-99 (1982), which examined the 
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As we pointed out in our earlier paper, despite Irwin’s clear 
rebuttable-presumption rule, lower courts reflexively (and incorrectly) 
relied on the case as authority for the proposition that equitable tolling is 
available against the United States, without engaging in an analysis of 
whether the presumption favoring tolling had been rebutted.33  In many 
instances, courts citing Irwin reflexively found that equitable tolling was 
available against the United States in FTCA actions.34  However, in United 
States v. Brockamp35 and United States v. Beggerly36 the Supreme Court 
rejected the notion that Irwin meant that equitable tolling is always 
available against the United States.  In those cases, the Supreme Court 
made more explicit what should have been clear from Irwin, namely courts 
are required to look at congressional intent¾as evinced in text, purpose, 
and legislative history¾to determine whether the presumption in favor of 
equitable tolling has been rebutted.37  In particular, the Brockamp Court 
articulated the Irwin test as follows: The rebuttable presumption may be 
overcome if there is “good reason to believe that Congress did not want the 
equitable tolling doctrine to apply” in a particular category of cases.38  
Accordingly, after Brockamp and Beggerly, courts are required to answer 
the following question: Is there good reason to believe that Congress did 
not intend equitable tolling to apply to FTCA cases? 
II. THE CURRENT ANSWER TO THE BEGGERLY-BROCKAMP QUESTION 
In the FTCA context, few courts have addressed the issue since 
Beggerly and Brockamp .  Those that have engaged in the required analysis 
found that Irwin’s rebuttable presumption had not been overcome and have 
concluded that the Act’s limitations periods can be equitably tolled.39  
Since Beggerly and Brockamp , however, some courts have not followed 
those decisions and have, instead, relied upon previous cases that cite Irwin 
as the basis for concluding that the Act’s limitations periods may be 
equitably tolled.40  The few cases that have specifically addressed Beggerly 
and Brockamp  require closer examination. 
 
statute of limitations provisions of Title VII (including the legislative history) and concluded 
that Congress intended equitable tolling to apply.  See id. at 392-98. 
 33 See Parker & Colella, supra note 3, at 887-88 (describing the pre-Irwin cases, which 
held that equitable tolling was unavailable under the FTCA, and the post-Irwin cases that 
held that equitable tolling was available). 
 34 See id. at 888 n.13 (cases cited therein). 
 35 519 U.S. 347 (1997). 
 36 524 U.S. 38 (1998). 
 37 See Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 48-49; Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 349-54. 
 38 Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 350. 
 39 See supra notes 6-8 (authorities cited therein). 
 40 See supra note 5 (authorities cited therein). 
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In Perez v. United States,41 the Fifth Circuit held that the FTCA’s 
two-year limitations period may be equitably tolled.  The court rejected 
suggestions in the legislative history that the FTCA should not be equitably 
tolled, reasoning that the arguments were “equivocal at best.”42  In reaching 
that conclusion, the Perez court concluded that “deductions from 
congressional inaction are notoriously unreliable.”43  The court also 
commented that “[p]erhaps these pieces of evidence are the best that can be 
collected from a legislative record that does not directly address the issue, 
but they are insufficient to overcome the presumption of Irwin that the 
government is subject to equitable tolling.”44  The district court’s decision 
in Stanfill v. United States45 proceeded along similar lines.  There, the court 
concluded that the six-month limitations period is subject to equitable 
tolling.46  Relying largely on Perez, the court held that the evidence from 
the FTCA’s legislative history was “scant” and “insufficient to rebut the 
presumption that equitable tolling should apply to the six-month limitations 
period . . . .”47  Finally, the district court in Forman v. United States48 
disregarded the legislative history altogether, concluding that neither 
Beggerly nor Brockamp  considered legislative history in their equitable 
tolling determinations.49 
 
 
 
 
 41 167 F.3d 913 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 42 Id. at 916 (citing Parker & Colella, supra note 3). 
 43 Id. at 916-17 (citing Lindahl v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 803 n.3 (1985) 
(White, J., dissenting)). 
 44 Id. at 917.  In addition to rejecting the legislative history, the Perez court also 
anchored its conclusion to the alleged non-jurisdictional nature of the FTCA’s limitations 
periods.  According to the court, “whether the limitations provisions of the FTCA are 
jurisdictionalin which case equitable tolling could not apply¾remains an open question 
in this circuit.”  Id. at 915 (emphasis added).  On this point, Perez is on shakier ground, for 
at least one court has already disagreed with Perez’s conclusion on the jurisdictional issue.  
See Heinrich v. Sweet, 44 F. Supp. 2d 408, 414 n.6 (D. Mass. 1999).  Most importantly, 
however, Perez is flatly inconsistent with other, post-Irwin Fifth Circuit decisions, in which 
the court has held that the Act’s limitation periods are jurisdictional.  See Flory v. United 
States, 138 F.3d 157, 159 (5th Cir. 1998) (“It is well-settled that these limitation periods are 
jurisdictional.” (emphasis added)); Johnston v. United States, 85 F.3d 217, 218 n.2 (5th Cir. 
1996) (“FTCA time limitations are jurisdictional.”); MacMillan v. United States, 46 F.3d 
377, 380 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The failure to timely file an administrative claim under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act is a jurisdictional defect.”). 
 45 43 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (M.D. Ala. 1999). 
 46 See id. at 1308. 
 47 Id. at 1308 (citing Parker & Colella, supra note 3). 
 48 No. Civ. A. 98-6784, 1999 WL 793429 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 1999). 
 49 See id. at *8 n.11 (citing Parker & Colella, supra note 3, at 905-15). 
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III. WHY LEGISLATIVE HISTORY MATTERS:                                         
CRASHING THE COCKTAIL PARTY 
The use of legislative history in statutory interpretation has fallen into 
disrepute in recent years.  Its use has been described as “the equivalent of 
entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests 
for one’s friends.”50  It may be amusing to think of legislative history as a 
“cocktail party,” and its interpretation as merely a search for one’s 
“friends.”  The real question, however, if we may carry the metaphor, is 
whether to attend the cocktail party at all, and, if so, whether there is 
something to be learned from getting to know everyone there.   
In our 1999 paper, we assumed that all indicators of congressional 
intent¾statutory text and legislative history¾were relevant to and 
probative of the question of whether the FTCA’s limitations periods may 
be equitably tolled.  Because we now wish to elaborate on the part of our 
earlier position that emphasized legislative history, we need to address a 
threshold issue: Why should legislative history be considered at all when 
courts answer the Beggerly-Brockamp  question? 
Of course, for trial attorneys the short answer is that the case law 
expressly endorses such an approach, a point we shall elaborate upon in a 
moment.  But first, we must look at the theoretical underpinnings of the 
approach we advocate here and consult the legal commentary on the 
subject.  There is plenty of it.  Over the years, numerous commentators 
have written about the propriety of relying on legislative history as a guide 
to statutory interpretation.51  What emerges are many schools of thought: 
 
 50 Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (attributing this 
statement to Judge Harold Leventhal). 
 51 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A  MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW 3 (1997); Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The 
Public Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1999); 
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 845 (1992); Kenneth R. Dortzbach, Legislative History: The Philosophies of Justices 
Scalia and Breyer and the Use of Legislative History by the Wisconsin State Courts, 80 
M ARQ . L. REV. 161 (1996); Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 
66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441 (1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court 
Read The Federalist but not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH . L. REV. 1301 
(1998); Henry M. Hart & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the 
Making and Application of Law 1247 (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); 
Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Construction or Destruction?, 11 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 43 (1988); William S. Jordan III, Legislative History and Statutory 
Interpretation: The Relevance of English Practice, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (1994); Michael H. 
Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of 
Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369 (1999); Alex Kozinski, Should Reading 
Legislative History be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807 (1998); 
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983);  Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in 
Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History 
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the textualists; the new textualists; the intentionalists (including the simple 
intentionalists and the imaginative reconstructionists); the purposivists; the 
common law originalists; and the public justificationists.52 
We shall not add another “ist” to this already over-crowded list of 
statutory constructionists.  As we have commented before in a different 
context,53 the academic commentary does more to obscure matters than to 
provide real insight into judicial decision-making, much less prescribe 
practical, clearly-defined paths for how judges decide cases.  Indeed, the 
commentary does not provide useful rules for those who actually will have 
to litigate and decide the equitable tolling question.  Contrary to the view 
among academics, our view is simple.  Judges take one of two approaches 
to the problem posed by legislative history: either they look only at the text 
of the statute (the textualists) or they go beyond the text to arrive at 
congressional intent (the intentionalists).  The benefits and drawbacks of 
relying on legislative history in statutory interpretation have been 
summarized quite well by Judge Kozinski,54 and we see no need to repeat 
them here.  Suffice it to say that the textualists disregard legislative history 
largely because they think it is illegitimate and unreliable, and 
intentionalists embrace legislative history mainly because they see it as a 
useful guide for understanding (but not replacing) the meaning of statutory 
language.55 
Let us now take a closer look at how textualists and intentionalists 
derive meaning from a waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statute.  The 
 
Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1998); Jack Schwartz & Amanda Stakem Conn, 
The Court of Appeals at the Cocktail Party: The Use and Misuse of Legislative History, 54 
M D. L. REV. 432 (1995); Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial 
Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833 (1998); 
Stephen F. Williams, Restoring Context, Distorting Text: Legislative History and the 
Problem of Age, 66 GEO. WASH . L. REV. 1366 (1998); Jesse M. Barrett, Note, Legislative 
History, the Neutral, Dispassionate Judge, and Legislative Supremacy: Preserving the 
Latter Ideals Through the Former Tool, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 819 (1998); Edward 
Heath, Note, How Federal Judges Use Legislative History, 25 J. LEGIS. 95 (1999); Note, 
Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
1005 (1992). 
 52 See Bell, supra note 51 (identifying the public justificationist and describing the 
simple intentionalist); Breyer, supra note 51 (identifying the intentionalist); Easterbrook, 
supra note 51 (the textualist); Hart & Saks, supra note 51 (identifying the purposivists); 
Posner, supra note 51, at 817-22 (identifying the imaginative reconstructionist); SCALIA, 
supra note 51 (identifying the new textualist); Schacter, supra note 51 (identifying the 
common law originalist). 
 53 See Ugo Colella & Adam Bain, The Burden of Proving Jurisdiction Under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act: A Uniform Approach to Allocation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2859, 
2885-86 (1999) (criticizing the numerous theoretical formulas for the burden of proof 
concept because most practitioners know what the concept means). 
 54 See Kozinski, supra note 51, at 812-14. 
 55 See id. 
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textualist school, whose most notable spokesperson is Justice Scalia, sees 
legislative history as the “last hope of lost interpretive causes, th[e] St. Jude 
of the hagiology of statutory construction . . . .”56  In the waiver-of-
sovereign-immunity context, Justice Scalia generally follows the textualist 
methodology.  In United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.,57 Justice Scalia, 
writing for a seven-to-two majority, reasoned that “[w]aivers of the 
Government’s sovereign immunity, to be effective, must be unequivocally 
expressed[,] . . . strictly construed in favor of the sovereign, and not 
enlarged . . . beyond what the language requires . . . .”58  According to 
Justice Scalia, an unambiguous statute cannot be made ambiguous by 
resorting to legislative history.  The Justice further noted that  “[i]f clarity 
does not exist, it cannot be supplied by a committee report.”59 
By contrast, the intentionalist takes a different view of the importance 
of legislative history in construing waiver statutes.  The intentionalist, 
whose most notable spokesperson is Justice Breyer, not only looks to the 
language of a statute, but also examines other reliable and relevant sources 
of congressional intent, including legislative history, when interpreting a 
particular statute.  Intentionalists do not seek to understand the subjective 
motivations of Congress, but rather to define congressional “intent” as the 
objective purpose behind legislation.60  For the intentionalist, legislative 
history is not always relevant or reliable.  Yet, the intentionalist will use 
legislative history in statutory interpretation when that history aids judges 
in crafting a workable, consistent, and understandable body of statutory 
law.61 
 
 56 United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 521 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 57 503 U.S. 30 (1992). 
 58 Id. at 33, 34 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 59 Id. at 37; accord Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (“A statute’s legislative 
history cannot supply a waiver that does not appear clearly in any statutory text . . . .”). 
 60 See Breyer, supra note 51, at 864 (“Conceptually . . . one can ascribe an ‘intent’ to 
Congress in enacting the words of a statute if one means ‘intent’ in its . . . sense of 
‘purpose’, rather than its sense of ‘motive.’”). 
 61 Id. at 862 (“‘If the history is vague, or seriously conflicting, do not use it.’  No one 
claims that history is always useful; only that it sometimes helps.”).  The author continues: 
[O]ne should recall that legislative history is a judicial tool, one judges use to 
resolve difficult problems of judicial interpretation.  It can be justified . . . by 
its ability to help judges interpret statutes, in a manner that makes sense and 
that will produce a workable set of laws . . . .  [C]ourts might use it as part of 
their overarching interpretive task of producing a coherent and relatively 
consistent body of statutory law . . . .”) (emphasis in original).   
Id. at 867  See generally 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 48:03 (6th ed., rev. 2000) (“It is established practice in American legal 
processes to consider relevant information concerning the historical background of 
enactments in making decisions about how a statute is to be constructed and applied.”). 
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Whether textualism or intentionalism is the “correct” method of 
statutory construction in the normative sense surely is not a matter that we 
address here; that debate is best left to the law professors, who have much 
to say on the subject.  Rather, we are more concerned with the practical, 
real-world problem of understanding how the Supreme Court and lower 
courts (who take their cues from the Court) will approach the question of 
whether equitable tolling is available in FTCA cases.  Unfortunately, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to get a firm grip on the Supreme Court’s 
approach to interpreting waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statutes.  The 
Court’s recent decision in West v. Gibson62 demonstrates why. 
In West, the Court had to decide whether, pursuant to Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) had the authority to award compensatory damages against the 
United States.  In a closely divided five-to-four decision, Justice Breyer 
(joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg) looked to 
“[t]he language, purpose, and history of the 1972 Title VII extension and 
the 1991 [Compensatory Damages Amendment]” to reach the conclusion 
that “Congress has authorized the EEOC to award compensatory damages 
in Federal Government employment discrimination cases.”63  Included in 
Justice Breyer’s analysis was a review of legislative history and the 
changes made to Title VII in 1972 and 1991.64 
In dissent, Justice Kennedy (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Scalia and Thomas) reasoned that, because the text of Title VII did 
not waive the United States’ immunity from an EEOC award of 
compensatory damages, Congress did not waive the United States’ 
immunity in the manner suggested by the majority.65  The dissenters 
disagreed with the majority’s resort to legislative history, reasoning that “it 
contradicts our precedents and sets us on a new course, for before today it 
was well settled that ‘[a] statute’s legislative history cannot supply a waiver 
that does not appear clearly in any statutory text.’”66 
The Court’s decision in West is one example of how the individual 
Justices interpret waiver statutes.  Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer have endorsed intentionalism through an analysis of 
Title VII’s legislative history, whereas Chief Justice Rehnquist, and 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas endorsed textualism by eschewing a 
legislative history analysis. 
 
 62 527 U.S. 212 (1999). 
 63 Id. at 217. 
 64 See id. at  219-21. 
 65 See id. at 224-28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 66 Id. at 228  (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Lane, 518 U.S. at 192). 
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The Court’s decision in Lane v. Pena67 provides a different 
understanding.  In Lane, Justices O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg¾who, 
as part of the majority, sanctioned the use of legislative history in 
West¾took a page out of the textualist book and insisted that a waiver of 
the federal government’s immunity “must be unequivocally expressed in 
statutory text” and that legislative history cannot supply a waiver of 
immunity where none exists in the text of the statute.68 
Whatever may be the fate of textualist or intentionalist approaches to 
construing congressional waivers of sovereign immunity in the run of 
cases, we have seen these two methodologies at work in the equitable 
tolling context.  Fortunately, the Court appears to have settled on one 
approach¾intentionalism.  But, it has not always been that way.  In 
Soriano v. United States,69 the Supreme Court initially endorsed a textualist 
approach to decide whether equitable tolling is available in suits against the 
federal government.  The Court in Soriano held that when Congress sets a 
limitations period in the text of a waiver statute, it “mean[s] just that period 
and no more.”70  Thus, Soriano, like Justice Scalia’s textualist opinion in 
Nordic Village, answers the equitable tolling question this way: If equitable 
tolling is not found in the text of the waiver statute, courts must conclude 
that equitable tolling does not come within the congressional waiver of 
sovereign immunity. 
However, Soriano’s textualist approach appears to have been 
displaced by Irwin, Brockamp , and Beggerly, which plainly prescribe an 
intentionalist framework for resolving the question of whether equitable 
tolling is permissible in a statute that waives the United States’ sovereign 
immunity.  The rebuttable-presumption rule prescribed by the Irwin Court 
necessarily requires courts to look beyond the text of a statute to determine 
whether Congress intended equitable tolling to apply.  Irwin instructs that if 
the text of a statute of limitations within a waiver statute does not include 
equitable tolling, that fact alone does not compel the conclusion that 
equitable tolling is impermissible.  According to Irwin, a difference in 
language (i.e., statutory text) is not enough to “manifest a different 
congressional intent with respect to the availability of equitable tolling.”71 
Moreover, the rebuttable -presumption rule itself endorses an intentionalist 
approach.  “[A]ll presumptions used in interpreting statutes,” the Supreme 
Court has said, “may be overcome by specific language or specific 
 
 67 518 U.S. 187 (1996). 
 68 Id. at 192 (relying on Justice Scalia’s opinion in United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 
503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992)). 
 69 352 U.S. 270 (1957). 
 70 Id. at 276. 
 71 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990). 
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legislative history that is a reliable indicator of congressional intent. . . .  
The congressional intent necessary to overcome the presumption may . . . 
be inferred . . . from the collective import of legislative and judicial history 
behind a particular statute .”72  In Brockamp  and Beggerly, we see the 
intentionalist methodology at work.  In those cases, the Court looked to the 
language of the waiver statutes, their purpose, their legislative history, or 
some combination of the three to reach the conclusion that equitable tolling 
was impermissible.73 
Indeed, not even Justice Scalia has insisted upon a textualist approach 
to resolve the equitable tolling problem, or, for that matter, other statutory 
construction problems that arise in the FTCA context.  Justice Scalia’s 
agreement with the Irwin majority is particularly interesting.  Justice White 
(joined by Justice Marshall, who can hardly be dubbed a textualist) issued a 
concurring opinion in which he carried the textualist banner.  Justice White 
reasoned that the Court should have held, consistent with Soriano, that 
equitable tolling was impermissible because the text of Title VII did not 
provide for it.74 Rather than follow the textualist approach suggested by 
Justice White, Justice Scalia instead joined the Irwin majority, which laid 
down a rebuttable -presumption rule of statutory construction.75  In 
Brockamp , the Court examined legislative history in reaching its 
conclusion that equitable tolling was impermissible,76 and in Beggerly, the 
Court looked to the text of, and the purposes behind, the Quiet Title Act in 
reaching its conclusion that equitable tolling was inconsistent with 
congressional intent.77  In each of these cases, which surely do not qualify 
for entry into the textualist hall of fame, Justice Scalia joined majority 
 
 72 Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
 73 See United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1998) (looking to the language 
and purpose behind the Quiet Title Act and concluding that equitable tolling is inconsistent 
with both); United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1997) (looking to language, 
purpose, and legislative history of tax-refund statute and concluding that equitable tolling is 
inconsistent with congressional intent); Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95 (looking to the fact that Title 
VII suits brought against private defendants subject to equitable tolling, such that same 
claims against the United States should also be subject to equitable tolling). 
 74 See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 98 (White, J., concurring) (“It seems to me that the Court in 
this case, by holding that the [30-day] time limit in [Title VII’s statute of limitations] is 
subject to equitable tolling, . . . has enlarged the waiver in [the statute of limitations] beyond 
what the language of that section requires.”). 
 75 Since Irwin, Justice Scalia has expressed his disapproval of the use of presumptions 
in statutory interpretation, referring to them as “dice-loading rules” that cause “a lot of 
trouble.”  See SCALIA, supra note 51, at 28. 
 76 See Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 352 (relying on House Conference Report). 
 77 See Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 49 (“Equitable tolling of the already generous statute of 
limitations incorporated in the QTA would throw a cloud of uncertainty over these rights, 
and we hold that it is incompatible with the Act.”). 
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opinions that endorsed an intentionalist approach to statutory construction.  
In addition, beyond the equitable tolling issue, Justice Scalia has often 
joined majority and dissenting opinions in FTCA cases that rely upon the 
Act’s legislative history.78 
Accordingly, although the text of waiver-of-sovereign-immunity 
statutes has factored into an examination of congressional intent, Justice 
Scalia (perhaps uncharacteristically) has not insisted that text, and text 
alone, remains determinative in every case.  That brings the intentionalist 
approach to interpreting waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statutes squarely in 
line with FTCA precedent.  Largely because the FTCA enjoys a rich 
historical pedigree, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he Federal 
Tort Claims Act of 1946 was the product of some twenty-eight years of 
congressional drafting and redrafting, amendment and 
counter-amendment.”79  Because of this rich pedigree, the Supreme Court 
has consulted the Act’s legislative history for genuine indications of 
congressional intent.  In particular, the Court has consistently relied upon 
the FTCA’s pre-enactment legislative history to determine what Congress 
intended in various provisions of the Act.80  In addition to the pre-
 
 78 See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 202-03 n.4 (1993) (Justice Scalia joining 
majority opinion, which relied on pre-enactment legislative history for interpreting meaning 
of language in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1994)); McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 112 n.7 
(1993) (unanimous decision relying on legislative history accompanying the 1966 changes 
to the FTCA); United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 167 n.9 (1991) (Justice Scalia joining 
majority opinion, which relied on legislative history accompanying the 1988 changes to the 
FTCA); Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 410-11 (1988) (O’Connor, J., joined by 
Rehnquist, C.J. & Scalia, J., dissenting) (relying on pre-enactment legislative history for 
guidance in interpreting assault and battery exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)); Berkovitz v. 
United States, 486 U.S. 531, 538-39 n.4 (1988) (unanimous decision relying on pre-
enactment legislative history for guidance in interpreting the discretionary function 
exception). 
 79 United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1949); see also Molzof v. United 
States, 502 U.S. 301, 308 (1992) (reporting that Congress spent twenty-eight years drafting 
and redrafting the FTCA); United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 707 (1961) (same).  See 
generally David S. Fishback & Gail Killefer, The Discretionary Function Exception to the 
Federal Tort Claims Act: Dalehite to Varig to Berkovitz, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 291, 291-94 
(1988) (analyzing the historical background of the discretionary function exception). 
 80 See Smith, 507 U.S. at 202-03 n.4 (consulting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k)); Berkovitz , 486 
U.S. at 538-39 n.4 (consulting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)); United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 
55, 59 (1985) (consulting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)); United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao 
Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 808-09 & n.8 (1984) (consulting 28 
U.S.C. § 2680(a)); Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 858 n.17 (1984) (consulting 28 
U.S.C. § 2680(c)); Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 463-64 & n.4 
(1980) (same); Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 531 (1973) (consulting 28 U.S.C. § 
2671 (1994)); Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 801 (1972) (consulting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) 
(1993)); United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 153-58 (1963) (deciding whether prisoners 
could state claims under FTCA); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 8-10, 14 & nn.15-
17, 20, 29 (1962) (consulting 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674); United States v. Gilman, 347 
U.S. 507, 511-12 n.2 (1954) (consulting 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1994)); Dalehite v. United 
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enactment history, both the Supreme Court and lower courts have relied 
upon the legislative history accompanying the 1949, 1966, and 1988 
changes to the FTCA’s statute of limitations.81  Thus, the FTCA’s 
legislative history is not only relevant, but critical to determine what 
Congress intended when it enacted and later modified the Act’s statute of 
limitations. 
Returning to the metaphor we introduced at the beginning of this 
section, Beggerly, Brockamp , Irwin, and well-settled precedent extend an 
invitation to the cocktail party.  Lower courts should accept the invitation. 
 
States, 346 U.S. 15, 26 n.11, 28 nn.17, 20, 45 (1953) (consulting 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 
2680(a)); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 549-50 & n.8 (1951) (deciding 
whether the United States can be sued for tort contribution); Spelar, 338 U.S. at 220-21 
nn.6-10 (consulting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k)); Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51-52 nn.2-
4 (1949) (deciding whether members of the armed forces could recover under FTCA). 
Although he has joined FTCA decisions in which the Act’s pre-enactment legislative 
history has been relied upon for ascertaining congressional intent, Justice Scalia has given a 
tongue-lashing to the use of failed legislative proposals in the interpretive process.  See 
United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 535 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I join 
the opinion of the Court except that portion which takes seriously, and thus encourages in 
the future, an argument that should be laughed out of court” [i.e., that Congress’s failure to 
enact a proposal has meaning]); id. (“Congress can not express its will by a failure to 
legislate.  The act of refusing to enact a law (if that can be called an act) has utterly no legal 
effect, and thus has utterly no place in a serious discussion of the law.”); id. at 536 (“[T]he 
Court’s fascination with the files of Congress (we must consult them, because they are 
there) is carried to a new silly extreme.  Today’s opinion ever-so-carefully analyzes, not 
legislative history, but the history of legislation-that-never-was.”); id. at 536-37 (“If we take 
this sort of material seriously, we require conscientious counsel to investigate (at clients’ 
expense) not only the hearings, committee reports, and floor debates pertaining to the 
history of the law at issue (which is bad enough), but to find, and then investigate the 
hearings, committee reports, and floor debates pertaining to, later bills on the same subject 
that were never enacted.  This is beyond all reason, and we should say so.”). 
 81 See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 426 (1995) (relying on H.R. 
REP.  NO. 100-700 and 1988 changes to Act); McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 112 
nn.7, 8 (1993) (relying on legislative history accompanying the 1966 changes to the Act); 
United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 167 n.9 (1991) (relying on H.R. REP. NO. 100-700 
and 1988 changes to Act); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120-21 n.6 (1979) 
(relying on H.R. REP. NO. 276 regarding the 1949 changes to the Act’s statute of 
limitations); Rodriguez v. Sarabyn, 129 F.3d 760, 764-65 (5th Cir. 1997) (relying on H.R. 
REP. NO. 100-700 and 1988 changes to Act); Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608, 610-11 
(9th Cir. 1982) (relying on S. REP. NO. 1327 regarding the 1966 changes to the Act); Tucker 
v. United States Postal Serv., 676 F.2d 954, 958 (3d Cir. 1982) (same); Odin v. United 
States, 656 F.2d 798, 801-02 nn.11, 17, 804-05 nn.25-26 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (same); Lunsford 
v. United States, 570 F.2d 221, 224 (8th Cir. 1977) (relying on H.R. REP.  NO. 1532 
regarding the 1966 changes to the Act); Menkarell v. Bureau of Narcotics, 463 F.2d 88, 90 
(3d Cir. 1972) (relying on H.R. REP.  NO. 276 regarding the 1949 changes to the Act’s 
statute of limitations). 
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IV.  THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ACCOMPANYING THE FTCA’S STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS AND WHAT IT SAYS ABOUT CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
Let us now return to the FTCA and place the equitable tolling 
question in the proper historical context, for that history provides valuable 
insights into whether Congress intended equitable tolling to apply to the 
Act’s limitations periods.  At the turn of the twentieth century, the United 
States was immune from tort liability under the historical doctrine of 
sovereign immunity.82 Not all tort compensation was precluded, but 
sovereign immunity prevented individuals from seeking tort compensation 
in Article III courts.  In the early 1900s, persons who suffered from tortious 
conduct committed by a government employee could seek compensation 
through a private bill of relief from Congress.83  The private bill consisted 
of a legislative proposal presented in Congress that would either provide 
tort compensation to an individual or provide the injured party with a 
jurisdictional ticket to adjudicate a particular claim.84  Although there were 
statutes on the books waiving the United States’ immunity for certain 
claims,85 there was no statute that generally waived the United States’ 
immunity from tort liability.  Some time passed before Congress finally 
enacted a tort statute applicable to the United States. During that time 
period, Congress actively tried to shape the contours of what would later 
become the FTCA. 
A. The Pre-Enactment Legislative History 
The federal tort claims legislation that made its way through various 
Congresses prior to the 1946 enactment of the FTCA reveals that equitable 
tolling provisions were proposed at various times and in various forms.86  
Between 1925 and 1931, bills that were introduced in the House and Senate 
contained a wide range of time limitations applicable to tort actions brought 
against the United States.  Three of the bills did not even include a waiver 
of sovereign immunity for property damage claims.87  In each of the 
proposals that waived immunity for all tort claims, the limitations period 
for property damage claims was different from the periods prescribed for 
 
 82 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821). 
 83 See Alexander Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort Claims Against the Federal 
Government, 9 LAW & CONTEMP . PROBS. 311, 314, 321-22 (1942). 
 84 See id. at 322; Roscoe Pound, The Tort Claims Act: Reason or History?, 37 TUL. L. 
REV. 685, 689 (1963). 
 85 See Holtzoff, supra note 83, at 314-20 (describing the few waiver-of-sovereign-
immunity statutes). 
 86 See infra p. 220 (table attached as an appendix to this paper presenting the various 
statute of limitations proposals that were considered by Congress prior to 1946). 
 87 See generally H.R. 8914, 69th Cong. (1926); H.R. 12179, 68th Cong. (1925); H.R. 
12178, 68th Cong. (1925). 
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personal injury and death claims.88  The 1926 House and Senate bills 
extended the limitations periods for personal injury and death claims (but 
not property damage claims) by six months if “reasonable cause” was 
shown.89  The 1926 bills provided that the limitations periods on all tort 
claims did not begin to run for persons under eighteen or for those who are 
“mentally incompetent” so long as “such individual[s are] without a 
guardian, trustee, or committee.”90 
In 1928 and 1930, the House and Senate again considered bills that 
prescribed different limitations periods for property damage, personal 
injury, and death claims.91  The limitations periods prescribed in the 1928 
and 1930 bills were different from the limitations provisions of the 1926 
bills.92  In addition, the 1928 and 1930 bills retained equitable tolling in 
personal injury and death cases for “reasonable cause shown,” and 
extended the tolling period from six months to one year.93  All limitations 
periods were subject to tolling in cases involving persons under the age of 
twenty-one, “idiots, lunatics, insane persons, and persons beyond the 
sea.”94  In 1931, however, the bills that were introduced in Congress did not 
include the “reasonable cause” provision,95 and only one of the bills 
contained a tolling provision for minors under twenty-one, “idiots, lunatics, 
insane persons, and persons [at] sea.”96 
In 1932, a Senate bill reinstated the “reasonable cause” provision.97  
 
 88 See S. 211, 72d Cong. (1931); H.R. 5065, 72d Cong. §§ 1(d), 202(a) (1931); H.R. 
17168, 71st Cong. §§ 2, 202 (1931); H.R. 16429, 71st Cong. §§ 1, 22 (1931); H.R. 15428, 
71st Cong. §§ 1(d), 202(a) (1930); S. 4377, 71st Cong. §§ 1(d), 202(d) (1930); H.R. 9285, 
70th Cong. §§ 1(b), 202(a) (1928); S. 1912, 69th Cong. §§ 1(b), 202(a) (1926); H.R. 8914, 
69 Cong. § 5 (1926); H.R. 6716, 69th Cong. (1926); H.R. 12178, 68th Cong. § 6 (1925). 
 89 See S. 1912, 69th Cong. § 202(a) (1926); H.R. 6716. 69th Cong. § 202(c) (1926).  But 
see H.R. 8914, 69th Cong. (1926) (not providing for any equitable tolling). 
 90 S. 1912, 69th Cong. § 304 (1926); H.R. 6716, 69th Cong. § 305 (1926); see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 69-667, at 7 § 305 (1926) (Committee report on S. 1912, stating that “the rights of 
minors and mental incompetents who are without a guardian, trustee, or committee at the 
time their claims accrue are protected, by providing that the [s]tatutes of limitation in the 
bill are tolled until the appointment of a representative to take advantage of their rights.” 
(emphasis added)).  But see H.R. 8914, 69th Cong. (1926) (not providing for any equitable 
tolling). 
 91 See H.R. 15428, 71st Cong. §§ 1(d), 202(a) (1930); S. 4377, 71st Cong. §§ 1(d), 
202(a) (1930); H.R. 9285, 70th Cong. §§ 1(b), 202(a) (1928). 
 92 See infra p. 220 (appendix table). 
 93 See H.R. 15428, 71st Cong. § 202(a) (1930); S. 4377, 71st Cong. § 202(a) (1930); 
H.R. 9285, 70th Cong. § 202(a) (1928). 
 94 H.R. 15428, 71st Cong. § 304 (1930); S. 4377, 71st Cong. § 304 (1930); H.R. 9285, 
70th Cong. § 304 (1928). 
 95 See S. 211, 72d Cong. (1931); H.R. 5065, 72d Cong. (1931); H.R. 17168, 71st Cong. 
(1931); H.R. 16429, 71st Cong. (1931). 
 96 See H.R. 16429, 71st Cong. § 34 (1931). 
 97 See S. 4567, 72 Cong., § 202(a) (1932). 
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The 1932 provision, however, differed in two material respects from the 
prior bills.  First, it applied to personal injury, death, and property damage 
claims.98  Second, the Senate bill provided that not only must “reasonable 
cause” be shown to trigger the tolling provision, but that plaintiffs suing the 
United States in tort were required to “prove affirmatively that the United 
States has not been prejudiced thereby.”99  Additionally, the House held 
hearings in 1932 to discuss H.R. 5065, which proposed that a property 
damage, personal injury, or death claim must be submitted to the agency 
involved or the Comptroller General within thirty days from the date the 
claim accrued.100  The claimant would then have one year after an agency 
denial to file suit in the Court of Claims.101  At the hearing, the House 
subcommittee wrestled with the issue of whether the thirty-day time frame 
was sufficient and whether, with such a short limitations period, private 
bills of relief waiving the statute of limitations should eventually be passed 
to ensure that a claimant could have his or her tort claim adjudicated.102 
Between 1933 and 1935, bills introduced in the Senate retained the 
“reasonable cause” and proof-of-no-prejudice provisions for all tort 
claims,103 but the House bills during that same period did not contain any 
tolling provisions at all.104  During the 1933-1935 period, the House and 
Senate also prescribed different limitations periods for property damage 
claims on the one hand, and personal injury and death claims, on the 
other.105  Only one 1934 House bill provided for a uniform limitations 
period of three years, but like the other House bills during the 1933-1935 
period, that bill did not provide for equitable tolling.106 
In 1939, however, H.R. 7236 and S. 2690, which were introduced in 
the House and Senate, dropped all equitable tolling provisions and set the 
limitations period for all tort claims at one year.  A plaintiff whose claim 
was below one thousand dollars, and was submitted to an agency for 
possible settlement, had six months to file suit in federal court after the 
agency denied the claim.107  The statute of limitations provisions in H.R. 
 
 98 See id., § 1(c) (property damage claims), § 202(a) (personal injury and death claims). 
 99 See id. 
 100 H.R. 5065, 72d Cong. §§ 1(d), 202(a) (1931). 
 101 See id. § 303(2). 
 102 See Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Claims, 72d Cong. 13-14, 
28-30, 34 (1932) (hereinafter 1932 House Hearings). 
 103 See S. 1043, 74th Cong. §§ 1(c) (property damage claims), 202(a) (personal injury 
claims) (1935); S. 1833, 73d Cong. §§ 1(c) (property damage claims), 202(a) (personal 
injury claims) (1933). 
 104 See H.R. 2028, 74th Cong. (1935); H.R. 129, 73d Cong. (1933). 
 105 See infra p. 220 (appendix table). 
 106 See H.R. 8561, 73d Cong. §10 (1934). 
 107 See S. 2690, 76th Cong. § 301 (1939); H.R. 7236, 76th Cong. § 301 (1939). 
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7236 and S. 2690 were discussed in 1940 before the Senate and House 
Judiciary Committees.  Attorney General Frank Murphy submitted a 
statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee, in which he applauded the 
limitations periods for being “short.”108  A House Judiciary Committee 
report prepared by Representative Emanuel Celler of New York (the 
sponsor of H.R. 7236) stated that the one-year limitations period prescribed 
for the Act “appears desirable in order to preclude possible prejudice to the 
Government.”109  According to a House Report, the six-month period 
“extended” the limitations period until the agency finally disposed of the 
claim.110 
Judge Alexander Holtzoff, acting as Special Assistant to Attorney 
General Murphy, testified about the proposed one-year time period.  He 
noted that a short statute of limitations was necessary, but that in cases of 
undue hardship, the claimant could still petition Congress for a private bill 
of relief, which was the traditional method for seeking tort compensation.  
His remarks before the Senate Judiciary Committee are noteworthy: 
Section 301 of Title III . . . provides for a statute of limitations of 1 year 
on these claims.  It seemed to us that a short statute of limitations, such 
as 1 year, is necessary for the purpose of protecting the interests of the 
Government, and is not unfair to the claimant, because the lawyer of 
the claimant should be able to bring this suit within 1 year after the 
cause of action has accrued.  If unusual cases of hardship arise, the 
claimant may still have recourse to a private bill, over which the claims 
committee would have jurisdiction.111 
Judge Holtzoff echoed that sentiment before the House, when he 
engaged in the following exchange with Representative Celler of New 
York and Representative John Robsion of Kentucky: 
MR. HOLTZOFF: . . . Title III contains provisions applicable to all 
claims under the act whether they are for less than $1,000 and 
submitted for administrative determination, or whether they are tried in 
court. 
MR. CELLER: Is 1 year a long enough time in which to present a claim? 
MR.  HOLTZOFF: Of course, it is a question, and it is subject to debate.  
We have a short statute of limitation of 1 year, but my thought is that, 
of course, there will be cases in which this will be too short a time. 
 
 108 H.R. REP. NO. 76-2428, at 5 (1940) [hereinafter H.R. REP. NO. 2428]; Tort Claims 
Against the United States: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 76th Cong. 11 (1940) [hereinafter 1940 Senate Hearings] (statement of Frank 
Murphy, Attorney General of the United States). 
 109 H.R. REP. NO. 2428, at 5. 
 110 See id. 
 111 1940 Senate Hearings, supra note 108, at 38 (emphasis added). 
COLELLA FORMATTED.DOC  2/7/2001  11:41 AM 
194 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:174 
MR.  CELLER: I had this in mind, that if you make it so short, then you 
will have lots of claims filed in Congress again. 
MR. HOLTZOFF: Yes; you will undoubtedly have private bills with that 
statute of limitations.  Of course, you have bills of that kind now, and 
we have even a 6-year statute in contract cases.  I might say this, that 
we had in mind that a tort claim is sometimes difficult to defend, and 
the longer your suit is postponed the more difficult it is to get evidence 
to defend it. 
MR. ROBSION: Most of the States have a 1-year limitation, or a great 
many of them do. 
MR.  HOLTZOFF: I think that some of them do.  The State of New York, 
I think, has a 3-year limitation on tort actions against private 
individuals, and a 6-year statute on contract claims; but it seems to me 
that this is one of those provisions that is properly subject to debate.  It 
might properly be increased if the feeling of the committee is that the 
time is too short.  It is one of those things that cannot be answered 
“Yes” or “No.”  I do feel, as you suggest Mr. Chairman [Celler], that if 
you make the time too short, you will be confronted with private bills as 
to individual claimants waiving the statute as to that particular claim 
because the claimant abandons his rights, or something of that kind.112 
Judge Holtzoff’s testimony plainly suggests that if an FTCA plaintiff 
could not comply with the time periods prescribed in the Act’s statute of 
limitations, then a tort remedy (in the form of a private bill of relief) would 
lie with Congress, not with the courts.  That, of course, was the view 
expressed in the 1932 House hearings.113  The 1940 Senate and House 
Hearings provided the only analysis of the statute of limitations, and the 
statute of limitations enacted in 1946 was, in all material respects, the same 
as the one discussed by Judge Holtzoff.114  The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly relied upon the 1940 legislative history, including Judge 
Holtzoff’s remarks, to ascertain Congress’s intent with respect to various 
provisions of the FTCA.115  So have a number of lower federal courts.116 
 
 112 Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 21 (1940) (hereinafter 1940 House Hearings) 
(testimony of Alexander Holtzoff) (emphasis added). 
 113 See 1932 House Hearings, supra note 102, at 13-14, 28-30, 34. 
 114 The only addition to the statute of limitations after 1939 was the six-month 
limitations period applicable to suits filed after a claimant withdraws a claim from agency 
consideration.  See H.R. 5373, 77th Cong., § 401 (1941); S. 2207, 77th Cong. § 401 (1942). 
 115 See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 202-03 n.4 (1993) (looking to S. 2690 and 
H.R. 7236 for original understanding of the foreign country exception of the FTCA and 
comparing that to 1942 changes); United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 55, 59 (1985) 
(relying on Judge Holtzoff’s discussion of the assault and battery exception); United States 
v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 808-09 & 
n.8 (1984) (looking to S. 2690 and H.R. 7236 for original understanding of discretionary 
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The commentary that immediately followed passage of the FTCA 
supports the view that the limitations periods prescribed in the original Act 
should not be extended.  One commentator, who described the limitations 
periods as “strictly operative,” agreed that failure to comply with the Act’s 
limitations provisions meant that tort compensation would come from a 
private bill of relief: “The claimant’s failure to make timely presentation 
still leaves him the alternative of obtaining a special Act waiving the 
defense of the statute of limitations . . . in such instances as the Congress 
may desire to set aside the statutory bar.”117  Another commentator, Judge 
Ben Moore of West Virginia, noted the “peculiarity” of the Act’s statute of 
limitations, and concluded that the limitations provisions do not contain a 
“saving clause or provision which would toll the statute where infants, 
insane persons, or others under disability are concerned.”118  To Judge 
Moore, this was unusual because such tolling provisions are “ordinarily 
found” in federal and state statutes of limitations.119  And, Professor 
Borchard commented that with the Act’s “short” statute of limitations, “it is 
possible that claims will still be presented to Congress.”120 
Most importantly, however, equitable tolling was included in nine of 
 
function exception and comparing that to 1942 changes); Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 
848, 858 n.17 (1984) (looking to testimony of Judge Holtzoff for congressional intent 
behind 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1994)); Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 
463-64 & n.4 (1980) (same); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 26 n.11, 28 nn.17, 20 & 
45 (1953) (looking to S. 2690 and H.R. 7236 for original understanding of discretionary 
function exception and comparing that to 1942 changes; pinning congressional intent on 
Judge Holtzoff’s discussion regarding the need for wrongful conduct, and that the FTCA did 
not contemplate liability without fault). 
 116 See Brock v. United States, 601 F.2d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1979) (relying on testimony 
of Judge Holtzoff regarding meaning of “law of the place” in the FTCA); United States v. 
Cohen, 389 F.2d 689, 691 & nn.13, 14 (5th Cir. 1967) (relying on H.R. 7236 hearings for 
congressional intent behind attorneys’ fees provision of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2678 (2000)); Panella 
v. United States, 216 F.2d 622, 625-26 (2d Cir. 1954) (relying on Judge Holtzoff’s 
testimony for an understanding of the assault and battery exception of the FTCA); 
Suchomajcz v. United States, 465 F. Supp. 474, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (relying on Judge 
Holtzoff’s testimony regarding the postal exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b)); In re Bomb 
Disaster at Roseville, Cal., on Apr. 28, 1973, 438 F. Supp. 769, 777-78, 782 (E.D. Cal. 
1977) (relying on Judge Holtzoff’s testimony regarding whether the FTCA precludes 
imposing strict liability on the United States); Adams v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 254 F. 
Supp. 78, 81 (E.D. Tenn. 1965) (citing Supreme Court’s reliance on Judge Holtzoff’s 
testimony in Dalehite); Colorado Ins. Group, Inc. v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 787, 791 
(D. Colo. 1963) (relying on Judge Holtzoff’s testimony regarding the purpose of the 
exceptions found in 28 U.S.C. § 2680). 
 117 Irvin M. Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act¾A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEO. 
L.J. 1, 40 (1946). 
 118 Ben Moore, Federal Tort Claims Act: Useful Discussion at Fourth Circuit 
Conference, 33 A.B.A. J. 857, 860 (1947). 
 119 See id. 
 120 Edwin Borchard, Tort Claims Against the Government: Municipal, State and Federal 
Liability, 33 A.B.A. J. 221, 222 (1947). 
COLELLA FORMATTED.DOC  2/7/2001  11:41 AM 
196 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:174 
the thirty-one bills prior to the enactment of the FTCA,121 though the Act 
passed by the 1946 Congress did not provide for any equitable tolling of 
the limitations periods.  Judge Moore’s observation in 1947 that the Act did 
not provide for tolling based on minority or mental disability was entirely 
correct, for six of the thirty-one pre-enactment legislative proposals did 
include tolling for infants, insane persons, and others under disability.122  
Courts, therefore, should conclude that the enacting Congress did not 
intend equitable tolling to apply to FTCA cases. 
This conclusion flows naturally from the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Muniz.123  There, the Court decided whether prisoners 
could bring FTCA claims.  In reaching the conclusion that prisoners may 
bring such suits against the United States, the Muniz Court examined the 
pre-enactment legislative history and noted that several pre-enactment 
proposals contained provisions that precluded prisoners from bringing tort 
claims, but that the enacted version of the FTCA did not contain any such 
exception.124  The Court stated: 
Six of the 31 bills introduced in Congress between 1925 and 1946 
either barred prisoners from suing while in federal prison or precluded 
suit upon any claim for injury to or death of a prisoner.  That such an 
exception was absent from the Act itself is significant in view of the 
consistent course of development of the bills proposed over the years 
and the marked reliance by each succeeding Congress upon the 
language of the earlier bills.  We therefore feel that the want of an 
exception for prisoners’ claims reflects a deliberate choice, rather than 
an inadvertent omission.125 
The reasoning in Muniz cannot be meaningfully distinguished from 
the point we are making here.  Equitable tolling provisions were included 
in several pre-enactment bills, so that, under the reasoning in Muniz, courts 
may conclude that the enacting Congress was well aware of equitable 
tolling when it passed the FTCA in 1946.  However, the 1946 Congress 
 
 121 See S. 1043, 74th Cong. §§ 1(c), 202(a) (1935); S. 1833, 73d Cong. §§ 1(c), 202(a); 
S. 4567, 72d Cong. §§ 1(c), 202(a); H.R. 16429, 71st Cong. § 34 (1931); H.R. 15428, 71st 
Cong. §§ 202(a), 304 (1930); S. 4377, 71st Cong. §§ 202(a), 304 (1930); H.R. 9285, 70th 
Cong. §§ 202(a), 304 (1928); S. 1912, 69th Cong. §§ 202(a), 304 (1926); H.R. 6716, 69th 
Cong. §§ 202(c), 305 (1926). 
 122 See H.R. 16429, 71st Cong. § 34 (1931); H.R. 15428, 71st Cong. § 304 (1930); S. 
4377, 71st Cong. § 304 (1930); H.R. 9285, 70th Cong. § 304 (1928); S. 1912, 69th Cong. § 
304 (1926); H.R. 6716, 69th Cong. § 305 (1926). 
 123 374 U.S. 150 (1963). 
 124 See id. at 156. 
 125 Id. (emphasis added); see also Canadian Aviator v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 222-
23 (1945) (looking to pre-enactment history of Public Vessels Act and drawing conclusions 
about congressional intent from absence of language in final act that was present in pre-
enactment proposals). 
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declined to include any of those equitable tolling provisions in the Act that 
was finally passed.  Thus, as in Muniz, Congress’s decision not to include 
equitable tolling in the original FTCA must be construed as a “deliberate 
choice, rather than an inadvertent omission.”126 
B. The 1949 Changes to the FTCA’s Statute of Limitations 
While the initial batch of FTCA cases percolated through the courts, 
the one-year period worked an injustice in many cases.  Indeed, between 
1946 and 1949, many FTCA suits were dismissed pursuant to the 
limitations period, with courts strictly adhering to the one-year time 
frame.127  Accordingly, and consistent with Judge Holtzoff’s suggestion in 
1940 that Congress could lengthen the limitation period if it found the 
period to be too short, the 1949 Congress extended the one-year limitations 
period to two years.  The bill originally introduced in the House prescribed 
a three-year limitations period, but when it emerged from the House 
Judiciary Committee, the three-year period was replaced with a two-year 
period.128  The House Judiciary Committee explained the reasons for 
expanding the FTCA’s limitations period to two years: 
The committee feels that, in comparison to analogous State and Federal 
statutes of limitation, the existing 1-year period is too short and tends 
toward injustice in many instances. 
. . .  
It will be observed, then, from the foregoing statistics that the existing 
limitations of 1 year in the Federal Tort Claims Act is manifestly unjust 
and not in consonance with the practice prevailing in analogous 
departments of the law. 
. . .  
The 1-year existing period is unfair to some claimants who suffered 
injuries which did not fully develop until after the expiration of the 
period for making claims.  Moreover, the wide area of operations of the 
Federal agencies, particularly the armed-services agencies, would 
increase the possibility that notice of the wrongful death of a deceased 
to his next of kin would be so long delayed in going through channels 
 
 126 Id. 
 127 See Anderegg v. United States, 171 F.2d 127, 128 (4th Cir. 1948) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 336 U.S. 967 (1949); Maryland ex rel. Burkhardt v. United States, 165 F.2d 869, 
873-74 (4th Cir. 1947); Franzino v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 10, 11 (D.N.J. 1949); Marino 
v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 190, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Wickman v. Inland Waterways 
Corp., 78 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D. Minn. 1948); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. United States, 76 F. 
Supp. 951, 954 (E.D. Va. 1948); Turkett v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 769, 770-71 
(N.D.N.Y. 1948). 
 128 H.R. REP. NO. 276, supra note 24, at 4; see also H.R. REP. NO. 1754, supra note 24, 
at 1. 
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of communication that the notice would arrive at a time when the 
running of the statute had already barred the institution of a claim or 
suit. 
It is not the intention of the Federal Government to deprive tort 
claimants to their day in court or of their remedies.  Nor, on the other 
hand, does it propose to encourage delay in the enforcement of a 
claimant’s rights or to harass the Federal agencies in their defense 
against such suits by increasing the difficulty of their procurement of 
evidence.  However, it is not believed that the enlargement of the 
existing period of limitations to 2 years as proposed . . . will 
unnecessarily vex the agencies concerned, nor will it foster a lack of 
diligence on the part of claimants in the prosecution of their claims.  
The period of 2 years proposed in the bill represents a happy medium 
which has been tested and found satisfactory in the laboratory of legal 
experience.129 
The report that the Senate Judiciary Committee published contained 
the same language as the House report.130  The plain import of the language 
in the 1949 Senate and House reports, like the testimony of Judge Holtzoff 
in 1940, indicates that Congress intended to cure the perceived unfairness 
in the FTCA’s statute of limitations by extending the limitations period 
applicable to all FTCA suits.  The language does not imply that Congress 
intended to incorporate equitable tolling into the Act and create special 
exceptions for narrow classes of cases.  As we said in our 1999 paper, the 
two-year period¾a “happy medium,” according to the 1949 
Congress¾reflects a congressional balance between compensating tort 
victims and protecting the United States against defending stale claims.131 
Indeed, H.R. 2403, a bill introduced in the House in 1949, would have 
permitted a maximum five-year extension of the two-year limitations 
period on the basis of equitable factors such as infancy and insanity.  In 
particular, the bill proposed a subsection (c) to 28 U.S.C. § 2401 that would 
have provided the following: 
(c) The time within which an action may be brought on a tort claim 
against the United States, or within which such claim may be presented 
for administrative settlement, shall not include any period during which 
a person entitled to bring such action or present such claim is under the 
age of twenty-one or is insane, or both, if any such disability of infancy 
or insanity, or both, exists when such claim accrues. The expiration of 
such time shall not be delayed for more than five years by reason of the 
disability of insanity.132 
 
 129 H.R. REP. NO. 276, supra note 24, at 2-4 (emphasis added). 
 130 See S. REP. NO. 135, supra note 24, at 2, 4. 
 131 See Parker & Colella, supra note 3, at 909. 
 132 H.R. 2403, 81st Cong., (1949). 
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H.R. 2403 was referred to the House Judiciary Committee on 
February 7, 1949.  However, the House Judiciary Committee Report we 
have quoted above was issued approximately one month later, and H.R. 
2403 is not even mentioned.  Although failed legislative proposals are 
generally frowned upon when used as evidence of the intent of a prior 
Congress,133 that surely cannot be the case here.  Congress changed the 
statute of limitations in 1949, and one may properly look to the proposals 
that were submitted and rejected¾for example, the proposal that would 
have expanded the limitations period to three years¾for indications of 
what the Congress may have intended.  Indeed, the only inferences that can 
be drawn from the fact that H.R. 2403 failed to pass support the position 
that Congress did not intend equitable tolling to apply.  Either Congress 
rejected the notion that equitable considerations such as minority and 
insanity could toll the statute of limitations, or the 1949 expansion of the 
statute of limitations incorporated such considerations (although we 
question the accuracy of this latter interpretation).  Both interpretations 
support the conclusion that Congress extended the statute of limitations in 
1949 to account for inequities in its application.134   
The possibility that Congress may have incorporated equitable tolling 
considerations into the 1949 changes to the Act by extending the statute of 
limitations brings us to another critical point.  The Supreme Court and 
lower courts have held that the FTCA’s two-year limitations period is tied 
to a discovery rule of accrual, in which a claim does not accrue¾and the 
limitations period does not begin to run¾until the claimant knows, or in 
the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know of her injury and its 
cause.135  This rule of accrual meets the 1949 House Judiciary Committee’s 
concern that the FTCA’s statute of limitations could be “unfair to some 
claimants who suffered injuries which did not fully develop until after the 
expiration of the period for making claim.”136  The Supreme Court in 
 
 133 See infra note 167 (authorities cited therein). 
 134 Cf. United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 533-34 (1998) (declining to 
draw inference in favor of government where failure of legislation could have meant 
something contrary to the government’s position). 
 135 See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979); Johnson v. Smithsonian 
Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 1999); Diaz v. United States, 165 F.3d 1337, 1339 (11th 
Cir. 1999); Lhotka v. United States, 114 F.3d 751, 752-53 (8th Cir. 1997); Bartleson v. 
United States, 96 F.3d 1270, 1277 (9th Cir. 1996); Kerstetter v. United States, 57 F.3d 362, 
364 (4th Cir. 1995); MacMillan v. United States, 46 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1995); 
Goodhand v. United States, 40 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 1994); Indus. Constructors Corp. v. 
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 15 F.3d 963, 969 (10th Cir. 1994); McDonald v. United States, 
843 F.2d 247, 248 (6th Cir. 1988); Barren ex rel. Barren v. United States, 839 F.2d 987, 990 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 827 (1988); Sexton v. United States, 832 F.2d 629, 633 
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Nicolazzo v. United States, 786 F.2d 454, 455 (1st Cir. 1986). 
 136 H.R. REP. NO. 276, supra note 24, at 3; S. REP. NO. 135, supra note 24, at 2; H.R. 
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Beggerly held that this precise rule of accrual, found in the text of the Quiet 
Title Act, already contemplates equitable  tolling-like considerations, 
thereby precluding any further tolling for judge-made equitable reasons.137 
C. The 1966 Changes to the FTCA’s Statute of Limitations 
Congress amended the FTCA’s statute of limitations again in 1966, 
when it imposed a mandatory administrative-exhaustion requirement on 
FTCA plaintiffs and imposed a corresponding six-month limitations period 
for filing suit after a claim is finally denied by an agency.138  The Justice 
Department drafted the proposed legislation, and Assistant Attorney 
General John W. Douglas was the only individual to provide testimony on 
the 1966 changes to the FTCA.  At the hearing before the House Judiciary 
Committee, Representative William L. Hungate of Missouri expressed 
concern about the proposed mandatory administrative-presentment 
requirement, fearing that FTCA plaintiffs would be delayed in seeking 
redress in federal court.  Mr. Douglas responded to this concern by pointing 
out that, in exchange for the mandatory administrative-presentment 
requirement, FTCA cla imants would have an additional six months within 
which to bring their tort claims against the United States.  This point was 
made in the following exchange between Mr. Douglas and Representative 
Hungate: 
MR.  HUNGATE: Yes.  Now, what about the statute of limitations?  Will 
this [mandatory administrative-presentment requirement] have any 
effect on the statute of limitations? 
MR. DOUGLAS: The statute of limitations is set out in the bill.  It 
actually expands the time within which a suit could be filed in court.  
At the present time there is a 2-year statute of limitations, and this bill 
permits 2 years to file with the agency plus 6 months after the agency 
acts or refuses to act. 
MR.  HUNGATE: In other words, the statute of limitations is extended or 
would be extended by this 6-month period? 
MR. DOUGLAS: That is right.139 
Thus, to accommodate the new mandatory administrative-exhaustion 
 
REP. NO. 1754, supra note 24, at 3. 
 137 See United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48 (1998) (“Here, the QTA, by providing 
that the statute of limitations will not begin to run until the plaintiff ‘knew or should have 
known of the claim of the United States,’ has already effectively allowed for equitable 
tolling.”). 
 138 See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994). 
 139 Improvement of Procedures in Claims Settlement and Government Litigation: 
Hearing Before Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 
(1966) [hereinafter 1966 Hearings] (testimony of John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney 
General) (emphasis added). 
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requirement, the 1966 changes had the added benefit of expanding the 
then-applicable two-year limitations period to include an additional six 
months to file suit after administrative remedies had been exhausted.  The 
view expressed in 1966 is fully consistent with the 1940 view of the six-
month limitations period, namely, that it operated as an extension of the 
time within which to bring a tort claim against the United States.140  In 
addition, in 1966, the Act’s statute of limitations was “simplif[ied]” to 
reflect the new changes to the procedure for adjudicating tort claims against 
the United States.141  The 1966 Congress intended this new administrative-
exhaustion procedure, combined with the corresponding limitations 
periods, to expedite the resolution of tort claims brought against the United 
States.  According to reports from the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees, the 1966 changes had the “purpose of providing for more fair 
and equitable treatment of private individuals and claimants when they 
deal with the Government or are involved in litigation with their 
Government.”142  Moreover, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees 
also concluded that “the more expeditious procedures provided by this bill 
will have the effect of reducing the number of pending claims which may 
become stale and long delayed because of the extended time required for 
their consideration.”143 
Although Congress added these procedures for a more expeditious 
consideration of tort claims, the 1966 congressional amendments did not 
make equitable tolling applicable to tort suits against the United States.  
This was not because Congress thought equitable tolling would 
automatically be incorporated into a statute that was silent on the issue.  To 
the contrary, the 1966 Congress legislated against the backdrop of the 
Court’s decision in Soriano, which held that when Congress prescribes a 
limitations period, it means “just that period and no more.”144  The 
Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress is aware of background 
legal principles when it enacts legislation and that those background 
principles must be considered when ascertaining congressional intent.145  
 
 140 See H.R. REP. NO. 2428, supra note 108, at 5. 
 141 H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 25, at 5; S. REP. NO. 1327, supra note 25, at 8. 
 142 H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 25, at 5 (emphasis added); S. REP. NO. 1327, supra 
note 25, at 2. 
 143 H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 25, at 6 (emphasis added); S. REP. NO. 1327, supra 
note 25, at 2. 
 144 Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957); see also Library of Cong. v. 
Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 319 (1986) (holding that waivers of sovereign immunity “must” be 
read against the backdrop of judicial decisions concerning the matter for which immunity is 
claimed to be waived), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Landgraf v. USI 
Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
 145 See Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 230-31 (1996); Franklin v. 
Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 71-72 (1992); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
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Nor can the 1966 Congress’s failure to include equitable tolling in the 
FTCA be explained by saying that Congress did not consider the subject.  
We know this because that same year, 1966, in the same set of FTCA 
bills,146 Congress enacted a three-year limitations period for tort claims 
brought by the United States that explicitly provided for equitable tolling in 
certain limited circumstances.147  It surely does not strain the interpretive 
imagination to conclude that Congress’s decision to include equitable 
tolling in tort cases brought by the federal government, but not to include 
equitable tolling in tort cases brought against the government, means that 
Congress did not intend equitable tolling to apply to FTCA 
cases¾especially with Soriano in the background. 
D. The 1988 Changes to the FTCA’s Statute of Limitations 
A new statute of limitations problem arose with the mandatory 
administrative-presentment requirement.  Between 1966 and the 1980s, 
many tort plaintiffs sued federal employees in state court, only to learn later 
that the employee was a federal employee acting within the scope of her 
employment at the time the tortious act or omission occurred.  Under the 
1966 changes to the FTCA, the United States was deemed the only proper 
party in tort cases involving certified federal employees, thereby triggering 
the mandatory administrative-presentment requirement.148  In many cases, 
 
Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 379 (1982); Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 
696-97 (1979). 
 146 See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY , ESTABLISHING A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR 
CERTAIN ACTIONS BROUGHT BY THE GOVERNMENT, H.R. REP.  NO. 1534, 89th Cong. 3 
(1966). 
 147 See 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b) (1994) (statute of limitations); § 2415(e) (1994) (tolling 
provision); § 2416 (1994) (tolling provisions).  In particular, the three-year limitations 
period applicable to tort suits brought by the United States may be equitably tolled under the 
following circumstances: (1) if the United States’ tort suit is dismissed without prejudice, 
the government can bring a second, otherwise time-barred suit if that second suit is filed 
within one year after the dismissal [under 28 U.S.C. § 2415(e)]; (2) “the defendant or the res 
is outside the United States, its territories and possessions, the District of Columbia, or the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico” [under 28 U.S.C. § 2416(a)]; (3) “the defendant is exempt 
from legal process because of infancy, mental incompetence, diplomatic immunity, or for 
any other reason” [under 28 U.S.C. § 2416(b)]; (4) “facts material to the right of action are 
not known and reasonably could not be known by an offical of the United States charged 
with the responsibility to act in the circumstances” [under 28 U.S.C. § 2416(c)]; or (5) “the 
United States is in a state of war declared pursuant to Article I, Section 8, of the 
Constitution of the United States” [under 28 U.S.C. § 2416(d)].   
 148 See 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1994) (“Subject to the provisions of this title relating to civil 
actions on tort claims against the United States, any such award, compromise, settlement, or 
determination shall be final and conclusive on all officers of the Government . . . .”); § 
2679(b)(1) (1994) (“The remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b) and 
2672 of this title for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death arising or 
resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the 
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment is exclusive of any 
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by the time a plaintiff discovered that an administrative claim had to be 
filed with the appropriate federal agency, the two-year limitations period 
for such claims had expired.  Thus, FTCA plaintiffs invoked the doctrine of 
equitable tolling to save their claims, making the same arguments that won 
the day in cases involving private tort defendants.  Federal courts, however, 
were not swayed.  In nearly all cases, courts declined to equitably toll the 
two-year limitations period, despite the admitted inequities that would 
result.149  For example, in Wollman v. Gross,150 the Eighth Circuit 
recognized the “harsh ramifications” of applying the two-year time period 
strictly in federal employee cases, but nevertheless concluded that 
“Congress has chosen to [impose the two-year time period] and any change 
is its prerogative and not that of the courts.”151 
In 1988, Congress did just that, and once again changed the FTCA by 
passing the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation 
Act.152  This amendment provided a procedure for substituting the United 
States as the proper party defendant in tort cases brought against federal 
employees acting within the scope of their employment when the tortious 
 
other civil action or proceeding for money damages by reason of the same subject matter 
against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim or against the estate of 
such employee.  Any other civil action or proceeding for money damages arising out of or 
relating to the same subject matter against the employee or the employee’s estate is 
precluded without regard to when the act or omission occurred.”). 
 149 See Houston v. United States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 896, 902 n.4 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(noting that reasoning of cases denying relief where limitations period has run before 
discovery of employee status is “persuasive”); Henderson v. United States, 785 F.2d 121, 
123 (4th Cir. 1986) (dismissing claim for failure to comply with two-year limitations period 
despite plaintiff not knowing employment status of tortfeasor until it was too late); Rogers 
v. United States, 675 F.2d 123, 124 (6th Cir. 1982) (“Neither plaintiff’s lack of knowledge 
regarding Stennies’ federal employment nor the United States’ removal of this case from 
state court to district court eliminates the jurisdictional requirement that a timely 
administrative claim be filed.”); Wollman v. Gross, 637 F.2d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 1980) 
(recognizing “especially harsh ramifications” but declining to extend the two-year period 
“whenever plaintiff is unaware of the status of the defendant as a federal employee acting 
within the scope of his employment”), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981); Flickinger v. 
United States, 523 F. Supp. 1372, 1375-76 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (declining to equitably toll 
limitations period where plaintiff did not discover that tortfeasor was federal employee until 
after two-year period expired); Dunaville v. Carnago, 485 F. Supp. 545, 548 (S.D. Ohio 
1980) (same); Lien v. Beehner, 453 F. Supp. 604, 606 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (same); Binn v. 
United States, 389 F. Supp. 988, 991-93 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (same); Baker v. United States, 
341 F. Supp. 494, 495-96 (D. Md. 1972) (same).  But cf. Staples v. United States, 740 F.2d 
766, 768 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that FTCA plaintiff, who sues federal employee in state 
court, satisfies presentment requirement); Kelley v. United States, 568 F.2d 259, 266 (2d 
Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978). 
 150 637 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981). 
 151 Id. at 549. 
 152 Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
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act or omission occurred.153  The 1988 changes to the FTCA were largely 
aimed at curing the problems produced by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Westfall v. Erwin,154 which held that federal employees could be personally 
liable in tort, unless they could prove they were acting within the scope of 
their employment and their actions were cloaked in government 
discretion.155  Fearing a massive expansion of tort liability, Congress acted 
swiftly and decisively, crafting a precise scheme for substituting the United 
States for the employee as the proper party-defendant.156 
Congress, however, went further than just crafting a new substitution 
procedure.  To remedy the perceived unfairness of barring plaintiffs who 
found out too late that the United States was the proper party-defendant, 
Congress provided for equitable tolling of the two-year period in limited 
circumstances.  Specifically, Congress extended the two-year limitations 
period where the administrative claim would have been timely filed with an 
agency on the date suit was filed against the employee, as long as the claim 
was presented to the appropriate federal agency within sixty days of the 
dismissal of the action.157  The House Report accompanying the 1988 
changes states: 
[S]ection 8 also contains provisions to ensure that no one is unfairly 
affected by the procedural ramifications of this provision.  For 
example, if an injury has occurred before H.R. 4612 is enacted, but no 
lawsuit has yet been filed relative to that claim, the claimant will have 
to pursue a remedy against the United States, not against the employee.  
If a lawsuit has been filed, but it has not proceeded to final judgment, 
the United States will be substituted for the employee (or, if the lawsuit 
has been filed against both the United States and the employee, the 
employee will be dismissed from the suit), and resolution will occur 
accordingly. 
Under H.R. 4612, no one who previously had the right to initiate a 
lawsuit will lose that right.  Similarly, no one who has already initiated 
 
 153 See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)-(5) (1994). 
 154 484 U.S. 292 (1988), superseded by statute as stated in Gutierrez de Martinez v. 
Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417 (1995). 
 155 See id. at 299. 
 156 See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1)-(2); § 2679 (d)(1)-(5). 
 157 See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(5); see also Mittleman v. United States, 104 F.3d 410, 412 
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (describing the inequitable circumstances that preceded the 1988 changes 
to the FTCA); Bewely v. Campanile, 87 F. Supp. 2d 79, 81 (D.R.I. 2000) (“In cases where 
the United States is substituted as a defendant, [§ 2679(d)(5)] provides relief from the two-
year period of limitations . . . .”); Filaski v. United States, 776 F. Supp. 115, 117 (E.D.N.Y. 
1991) (“[A]s to a situation in which the United States is substituted as defendant, . . . the 
FTCA provides protection for the plaintiff who has no knowledge of the federal presence in 
a case.”); Egan v. United States, 732 F. Supp. 1248, 1250 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (discussing the 
equitable tolling provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(5)). 
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a suit will lose their claims solely because the procedural prerequisites 
associated with the FTCA are being made applicable.  Persons who 
have a claim, but have not initiated a lawsuit, will still be allowed to 
submit an administrative claim against the United States for up to two 
years after the date of enactment, or within the time remaining under 
what otherwise would be the applicable state statute of limitations. 
Persons who have initiated a lawsuit but never submitted an 
administrative claim to the Government will not lose their right to 
pursue a lawsuit for having failed to submit such a claim.  Instead, as 
long as their suit was timely under state law when it was filed, they will 
have at least 60 more days to file a timely administrative claim.158 
Thus, just like it did in 1949, Congress changed the Act’s statute of 
limitations in 1988 to account for inequities in its application. 
V. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE CURRENT ANSWER TO THE 
BEGGERLY-BROCKAMP QUESTION 
This rather extended discussion of the FTCA’s legislative history 
demonstrates that Congress has modified the limitations periods in the Act 
when those periods produced seemingly inequitable results.  The one-year 
period in the original Act was applauded for being “short,” and the 
recommended remedy for failing to comply with that time period was a 
private bill from Congress.  The firm, one-year period stood in sharp 
contrast to many of the pre-enactment proposals, which made some form of 
equitable tolling available.  However, in 1949, Congress extended the one-
year time period to two years because the one-year period proved to be 
“manifestly unjust” and “tend[ed] toward injustice in many instances.”159  
In 1966, the statute of limitations provided claimants with an additional six 
months to bring a tort claim against the United States. That change, 
combined with the new administrative-exhaustion requirement, was 
designed to provide for more “fair and equitable treatment” of FTCA 
plaintiffs.160  That same year, and in the same set of bills, Congress 
provided for equitable tolling in tort cases brought by the federal 
government.  Finally, in 1988, Congress remedied the possible 
“unfair[ness]” that would result from the substitution procedure by 
providing equitable tolling in the text of the Act.161  Courts often analyze 
the history of a waiver-of-immunity-statute to determine congressional 
 
 158 H.R. REP. NO. 100-700, at 7, 8 (1988) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) 
[hereinafter H.R. REP. NO. 100-700]. 
 159 H.R. REP. NO. 276, supra note 24, at 2, 3; S. REP. NO. 135, supra note 24, at 3, 4; 
H.R. REP. NO. 1754, supra note 24, at 2, 3. 
 160 See H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 25, at 5; S. REP. NO. 1327, supra note 25, at 2. 
 161 See H.R. REP. NO. 100-700, supra note 158, at 7. 
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intent.162 
Accordingly, the point here is not simply that Congress’s failure to 
include equitable tolling for particular circumstances equals an intent to 
preclude equitable tolling in other circumstances.  Rather, we have shown 
that, unlike many other waiver statutes, Congress has been actively 
involved in modifying the FTCA’s statute of limitations.  Furthermore, 
each time it has done so, Congress has extended the limitations period for 
equitable reasons¾in 1949, by one year; in 1966, by six months; and in 
1988, by sixty days.  The Supreme Court has noted that “[w]hen Congress 
acts to amend a statute it intends its amendment to have real and substantia l 
effect.”163  If judge-made equitable tolling were available in 1949, 1966, 
and 1988, there would have been no need for Congress to make the 
changes that it did¾especially in 1988, when it provided for equitable 
tolling in the text of the Act itself. 
Let us come back, then, to the statement in Perez v. United States and 
Stanfill v. United States that “deductions from congressional inaction are 
notoriously unreliable.”164  The legislative history presented here 
demonstrates that this statement is simply irrelevant to the question of 
whether the FTCA’s limitations periods should be equitably tolled.  Here, 
Congress has acted, and we can naturally infer an intent from those actions.  
Additionally, we have not relied upon minor, potentially out-of-context 
expressions of congressional intent that are often cited by textualists and 
intentionalists as a reason for rejecting the use of legislative history in 
statutory construction.165  Rather, we have presented a relatively consistent 
story of congressional intent, with no counter-indications from crafty 
legislators, in which Congress has considered equitable tolling several 
times and specifically codified equitable tolling for limited situations.  No 
leap of faith is required to conclude that Congress intended to preclude 
 
 162 See, e.g., West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 214-19 (1999) (tracing the history of Title 
VII); United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 55-56 (1985) (tracing history of changes to 
assault and battery exception in FTCA); United States v. United Cont’l Tuna Corp., 425 
U.S. 164, 166-67 (1976) (tracing the history of the Suits in Admiralty Act); Marine Coatings 
of Alabama. v. United States, 71 F.3d 1558, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1996) (tracing the history of 
the Public Vessels Act). 
 163 Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995). 
 164 Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913, 917 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Lindahl v. Office of 
Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 803 n.3 (1985) (White, J., dissenting)); Stanfill v. United States, 
43 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1308 (M.D. Ala. 1999). 
 165 See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 51, at 810 (“Committee reports are written and floor 
statements are often made for the very purpose of influencing the courts.”); SCALIA, supra 
note 51, at 34 (“Nowadays . . . when it is universally known and expected that judges will 
resort to floor debates and (especially) committee reports as authoritative expressions of 
‘legislative intent,’ affecting the courts rather than informing the Congress has become the 
primary purpose of the exercise.”). 
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equitable tolling in other circumstances.  Justice Holmes wrote that “it is 
not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: We see what you are 
driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as 
before.”166 
Moreover, we have not relied upon legislative history of the sort 
indicated by Perez and Stanfill, namely, legislative proposals that were 
considered in subsequent Congresses that did not change the statute of 
limitations.  We specifically disavowed that approach in our 1999 paper.167  
To the contrary, we have pointed to the pre-enactment legislative history, 
which the Supreme Court has repeatedly relied upon as probative of 
congressional intent.168  Indeed, the Court’s Muniz decision, which is 
merely one of several Supreme Court decisions that rely upon the FTCA’s 
pre-enactment legislative history, supports the view that pre-enactment 
proposals are highly probative of Congress’s intent when it enacted the 
statute in 1946.169  We have also relied upon the legislative history 
accompanying the 1949, 1966, and 1988 changes to the Act’s statute of 
 
 166 Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908). 
 167 See Parker & Colella, supra note 3, at 910-11 n.119.  In particular, we declined to 
rely on equitable tolling proposals that were introduced in the House in 1989 because 
Congress did not change the FTCA’s statute of limitations that year.  See id.  Had we relied 
upon those 1989 proposals, we would have run afoul of the well-established Supreme Court 
authority to which Perez and Stanfill referred.  See Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994) (“We have stated, however, that 
failed legislative proposals are a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an 
interpretation of a prior statute.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Pension Benefit 
Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (“[S]ubsequent legislative history is a 
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier Congress.”) (internal quotations and 
citation omitted); United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962) (“[S]tatutes are construed 
by the courts with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the passage.  The 
interpretation placed upon an existing statute by a subsequent group of Congressmen who 
are promoting legislation and who are unsuccessful has no persuasive significance here.”); 
United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) (“[T]he views of a subsequent Congress 
form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.”); United States v. United 
Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 282 (1947) (“We fail to see how the remarks of these 
Senators in 1943 can serve to change the legislative intent of Congress expressed in 1932 . . 
. .”). 
Even so, the Court has not always been consistent on this point, especially in the 
waiver-of-sovereign-immunity context generally, and in the FTCA context in particular.  
See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 & n.11 (1994) (mentioning failed legislative 
proposals considered by Congress in support of Court’s conclusion that “[w]e leave it to 
Congress to weigh the implications of such a significant expansion of Government 
liability”); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 686-88 & n.6 (1987) (citing failed 
legislative proposals in support of Court’s conclusion that it declined to allow service 
members to bring medical malpractice suits against the United States); Carlson v. Green, 
446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980) (citing failed legislative proposals as support for Court’s conclusion 
that “Congress has not taken action . . . that would expand the exclusivity of FTCA”). 
 168 See supra note 81 (authorities cited therein). 
 169 See id. 
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limitations—legislative evidence that courts have routinely consulted for 
ascertaining congressional intent.170  Thus, all of this legislative evidence, 
with its documented impact on judicial interpretations of the FTCA, cannot 
simply be dismissed as “equivocal” or “scant,”171 especially because the 
Perez and Stanfill courts did not take a hard look at the Act’s legislative 
history. 
The picture that emerges from an analysis of the FTCA’s legislative 
history is that, as originally enacted, Congress did not intend equitable 
tolling to apply.  Instead, Congress envisioned that a private bill of relief 
provided the proper remedy for failure to comply with the Act’s limitations 
periods.  Attorney General Murphy’s statements, Judge Holtzoff’s 
testimony, and the Supreme Court’s Muniz decision, support this 
conclusion.172   
To conclude that equitable tolling is permissible in FTCA cases, one 
would have to find that, when the statute of limitations was changed in 
1949, 1966, and 1988, Congress did an about-face and intended to permit 
the judiciary to expand the limitations period through the doctrine of 
equitable tolling.  As we have shown, the legislative history compels 
precisely the opposite conclusion.  Congress modified the limitations 
period to account for inequitable circumstances, expanding the period from 
one to two years in 1949, adding an additional six months in 1966, and 
including equitable tolling in the text of the Act in 1988.  These affirmative 
congressional actions belie any suggestion that Congress intended the 
courts, through the doctrine of equitable tolling, to cure any unfairness that 
may flow from the Act’s limitations periods. 
Perhaps the legislative history of the FTCA’s statute of limitations is 
accorded little weight because of the perception that, unlike the tax-refund 
statute in Brockamp  and the Quiet Title Act in Beggerly, equitable tolling 
has historically been applied to the run-of-the-mill tort action.173  
Accordingly, by putting the United States on a par with private tort 
defendants, one might argue that Congress may have intended for equitable 
tolling to apply to tort claims brought against the United States.174  This 
 
 170 See supra note 81 (authorities cited therein). 
 171 See Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913, 916 (5th Cir. 1999); Stanfill v. United 
States, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1308 (M.D. Ala. 1999). 
 172 See supra Part IV.A. 
 173 See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL. ,  PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS§§ 1, 3, at 6, 15-20 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (presenting the 
underlying principles of tort law). 
 174 See Forman v. United States, No. Civ.A.98-6784, 1999 WL 793429, at *9 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 6, 1999) (“[T]ort law historically has accounted for individual facts, balancing 
analyses, and equitable considerations . . . .  Unlike cases recently considered by the Court, 
the very nature of tort law suggests that equitable considerations are proper under the 
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argument has surface appeal, for it is plain that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Irwin was crafted to avoid the anomalous result that Title VII 
claims involving private defendants would be subject to equitable tolling, 
whereas the same claims against the United States would not.175  In fact, the 
legislative history accompanying Title VII specifically supported the 
conclusion that the time periods in that statute may be equitably tolled.176 
This anomaly, however, does not arise in the FTCA context.  It is no 
doubt true that the FTCA holds the United States liable in tort in the same 
manner as a private defendant in the locality within which the tortious acts 
or omissions occurred.177  For statute of limitations purposes, however, the 
United States is not treated like a private defendant, for it is well 
established that the FTCA itself, not state law, prescribes the applicable 
limitations periods for FTCA suits as well as the relevant rules for 
limitations of actions.178  Thus, unlike private defendants, who may be 
subject to varied state law limitations periods and different statute of 
limitations rules, the United States is subject only to those time periods and 
limitations rules specified in the FTCA.  Congress’s decisions to modify 
the Act’s limitations periods in 1949, 1966, and 1988, fully support this 
distinguishing characteristic of the FTCA. 
For this reason, the rules of Lane v. Pena179 and Library of Congress 
v. Shaw180 are more analogous than Irwin to the equitable tolling problem 
presented in the FTCA context.  The statutes at issue in Lane and Shaw, 
unlike the statute in Irwin, did not place the United States on the same 
footing as private defendants with respect to the statutory provisions at 
 
FTCA.”). 
 175 See, e.g., Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 696-97 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Crucial to the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Irwin, that equitable tolling applies in suits under Title VII 
against the United States, was the fact that ‘the statutory time limits applicable to lawsuits 
against private employers under Title VII are subject to equitable tolling.’” (quoting Irwin v. 
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990))), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1148 (1997). 
 176 See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392-98 (1982) (cited and 
relied upon in Irwin). 
 177 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1) (1993), 2674. 
 178 See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 13-14 & n.28 (1962); Bartleson v. United 
States, 96 F.3d 1270, 1277 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996); Johnston v. United States, 85 F.3d 217, 219 
(5th Cir. 1996); Miller v. United States, 932 F.2d 301, 303 (4th Cir. 1991); Ulrich v. 
Veterans Admin. Hosp., 853 F.2d 1078, 1080 (2d Cir. 1988); Zeleznik v. United States, 770 
F.2d 20, 22 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); Stoleson v. United States, 
629 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1980); Maryland ex rel. Burkhardt v. United States, 165 F.2d 
869, 871-74 (4th Cir. 1947). The only exception, of course, is found in the 1988 changes to 
the Act’s statute of limitations, where Congress explicitly permitted state law limitations 
periods to be used as a device for saving claims that would be time-barred under the 
substitution procedure.  See H.R. REP. NO. 100-700, supra note 158, at 7-8. 
 179 518 U.S. 187 (1996). 
 180 478 U.S. 310 (1986), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Landgraf v. 
USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
COLELLA FORMATTED.DOC  2/7/2001  11:41 AM 
210 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:174 
issue in those cases.  The Lane and Shaw Courts thereby concluded that, 
absent a clear congressional intent to the contrary, remedies available  in 
suits against private defendants were not available in suits against the 
United States.181  Indeed, the Court’s decision in Shaw is particularly 
illustrative because the statute at issue in that case, like the FTCA, rendered 
the United States liable “the same as a private person.”182  However, the 
Shaw Court did not put any weight on that fact largely because it begged 
the question of whether Congress waived the United States’ immunity for 
the remedy sought.183  Courts, therefore, should reject the suggestion that 
general principles of tort law applicable to private parties, which are 
disclaimed in other parts of the FTCA,184 require equitable tolling in FTCA 
cases. 
The unique role that Congress has played in determining the 
applicable limitations periods in FTCA suits also renders unpersuasive 
comparisons to other waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statutes¾an analysis 
undertaken by the Perez and Forman courts.185  The Supreme Court in 
Irwin encouraged lower courts to eschew conclusions about equitable 
tolling based on the linguistic nuances of statutes of limitations.186  Indeed, 
the Beggerly Court did not compare the language of the relatively simple 
statute of limitations in the Quiet Title Act with the relatively complex 
 
 181 See Lane, 518 U.S. at 196; Shaw, 478 U.S. at 316-19. 
 182 Shaw, 478 U.S. at 319; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (1993) (stating that United 
States held liable in tort in the same manner as a private party); § 2674 (same). 
 183 See Shaw, 478 U.S. at 319.  In Shaw the Court stated:  
Title VII’s provision making the United States liable ‘the same as a private 
person’ waives the Government’s immunity from attorney’s fees, but not 
interest.  The statute, as well as its legislative history, contains no reference 
to interest.  This congressional silence does not permit us to read the 
provision as the requisite waiver of the Government’s immunity with respect 
to interest. 
Id. 
 184 Indeed, unlike private tort defendants, the United States is not liable in a variety of 
circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1994) (retaining immunity against civil actions for 
assault and battery, false imprisonment, false arres, libel or slander, and negligent or 
intentional misrepresentations); 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994) (punitive damages and 
prejudgment interest); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (strict liability); 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) 
(discretionary acts rooted in policy); 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1994) (acts of independent 
contractors).  See also Neustadt v. United States, 366 U.S. 696 (1961) (affirming immunity 
for negligent or intentional misrepresentations); Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972) 
(affirming immunity against strict liability actions).  See generally PROSSER & KEETON, 
supra note 173, § 131, at 1032-42 (detailing the differences between general tort law and the 
FTCA). 
 185 See Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913, 917 (5th Cir. 1999); Forman, 1999 WL 
793429, at *9. 
 186 See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) (“[W]e are not 
persuaded that the difference between [the statutes of limitations] is enough to manifest a 
different congressional intent with respect to the availability of equitable tolling.”). 
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language of the tax statute in Brockamp .  In Brockamp , the Court merely 
held that the language of the tax statute’s limitations periods indicated a 
congressional intent to foreclose equitable tolling, not that the language 
itself, severed from other indicators of congressional intent, compelled the 
conclusion that Congress did not intend equitable tolling to apply. 
In this regard, Perez and Forman are mirror images of the pre-
Brockamp and pre-Beggerly decisions that held that the tax-refund statute 
and the Quiet Title Act were subject to equitable tolling.  In Brockamp v. 
United States,187 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that equitable tolling was 
proper because “[t]he specific language of the statute does not speak to the 
application of equitable tolling principles” and that “the legislative history 
of [the tax-refund statute] ‘is absolutely devoid of any indication that 
Congress intended to preclude such equitable tolling in tax refund 
actions.’”188  In Fadem v. United States,189 a case the Supreme Court 
remanded to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration in light of Brockamp , the 
court held that the twelve-year limitations period in the Quiet Title Act 
could be equitably tolled because, unlike the statute in Brockamp , the Quiet 
Title Act’s statute of limitations “is non-technical, non-substantive and 
comprised of two short sentences . . . .”190  Perez and Forman said 
precisely the same thing about the FTCA.191  If the legislative history of the 
tax-refund statute did not contain an explicit statement that equitable tolling 
is impermissible (yet the Supreme Court found that equitable tolling was 
impermissible nevertheless), and if the language of the Quiet Title Act was 
 
 187 67 F.3d 260 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d, 519 U.S. 347 (1997). 
 188 Id. at 262 (quoting Johnsen v. United States, 758 F. Supp. 834, 835-36 (E.D.N.Y. 
1991)). 
 189 113 F.3d 167 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 190 Id. at 168. 
 191 See Perez, 167 F.3d at 917.  The Perez court noted:  
Perhaps these pieces of evidence are the best that can be collected from a 
legislative record that does not directly address the issue, but they are 
insufficient to overcome the presumption of Irwin that the government is 
subject to equitable tolling . . . .  By comparison, § 2401 makes just one 
distinction, between the time period generally applicable and that applicable 
if an agency issues a final denial of the claim.    
Id.   
Similarly, the Forman  court stated:  
Section 2401 is a garden variety limitations provision, without the attention 
to detail in [the tax-refund statute] that suggested preemption of equitable 
remedies . . . .  In comparison, the Court [in Irwin] held that the limitations 
period of Title VII was subject to equitable tolling in part due to the simple 
language and to the separate treatment of limitations periods from the 
treatment of substantive questions . . . .  In Irwin, however, the Court 
compared similar language to a less emphatic limitations provision and found 
the particular choice of similar words not dispositive.   
Forman, 1999 WL 793429, at *9.   
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not as complex as that of the tax refund statute (yet the Supreme Court 
found that equitable tolling was impermissible anyway), then it stands to 
reason that the same reasoning recycled in FTCA cases should also be 
rejected. 
Even so, comparing the FTCA to the statutes at issue in Beggerly and 
Brockamp  provides no definitive answers because the FTCA is both 
different from, and similar to, both statutes.  The FTCA’s statute of 
limitations contains the same simple language as the Quiet Title Act, which 
was at issue in Beggerly, and also has a built-in tolling provision like that 
Act.  In addition, the text of the FTCA contains equitable tolling,192 as did 
the tax statute at issue in Brockamp , and, like the tax statute, contains a 
legislative history replete with references to protecting the United States 
against stale claims.193  On the other hand, the FTCA’s limitations periods 
are relatively “short,” while Beggerly’s Quiet Title Act had a “long” 
limitations period.  The FTCA is unlike Brockamp’s tax statute because the 
limitations provisions of the FTCA are not as complex as those in the tax 
statute, and because there are fewer FTCA claims submitted than tax 
claims.  Therefore, one cannot draw any principled conclusion about 
whether Congress intended to allow equitable tolling of the FTCA’s statute 
of limitations by comparing the Act with other waiver statutes. 
Moreover, the Perez and Forman courts’ use of the “linguistic 
simplicity” method of analysis is flawed for another, more important 
reason.  According to those courts, the FTCA’s limitations periods may be 
equitably tolled because the language of the Act’s statute of limitations is 
“a garden variety limitations provision.”194  This conclusion, however, 
cannot be squared with the Act’s legislative history.  In 1966, the House 
and Senate Judiciary Committee Reports made clear that Congress’s intent 
was to “simplif[y]” the Act’s statute of limitations and to conform the 
statute of limitations to the newly-added mandatory administrative-
exhaustion requirement.195  Thus, it would be wrong to conclude that 
 
 192 See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(5)(A)-(B) (1994). 
 193 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 25, at 6-7; S. REP. NO. 1327, supra note 25, 
at 2-3; H.R. REP. NO. 276, supra note 24, at 4; S. REP. NO. 135, supra note 24, at 2-3; H.R. 
REP . NO. 1754, supra note 24, at 4; H.R. REP. NO. 2428, supra note 108, at 5. 
 194 Perez, 167 F.3d at 917; see also Forman, 1999 WL 793429, at *9 (holding that six-
month limitations period in FTCA is not complex or tied to jurisdiction of federal courts, 
therefore equitable tolling of that period was permissible). 
 195 See H.R. REP. NO. 1532, supra note 25, at 5; S. REP. NO. 1327, supra note 25, at 8.  
In particular, the House and Senate Reports stated the following: 
This section amends the provisions of section 2401, the limitations section, to 
conform the section to the amendments added by the bill.  The amendments 
have the effect of simplifying the language of section 2401 to require that a 
claimant must file a claim in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within 
2 years after the claim accrues, and to further require the filing of a court 
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equitable tolling applies to FTCA cases on the ground that the Act’s statute 
of limitations is “simple,” when the reason for the simplicity has nothing to 
do with whether equitable tolling is permissible.  In addition to the 1966 
legislative history, we question whether simplicity in a waiver-of-
sovereign-immunity statute somehow allows a court to apply equitable 
considerations and excuse a plaintiff from complying with the simple terms 
of a statutory provision.  For instance, the Supreme Court and lower courts 
have declined to find any equitable exceptions to the FTCA’s mandatory 
administrative-presentment requirement, finding the requirement “clear,” 
easy to understand, and not terribly difficult to follow.196  Therefore, 
neither as a matter of precedent nor logic can the “simplicity” rationale 
support a finding that the FTCA’s limitations periods may be equitably 
tolled. 
Nor do we believe that the lengths of the FTCA’s limitations periods 
have any bearing on the equitable tolling issue.  The district court in 
Forman held that the six-month limitations period could be equitably tolled 
because, among other reasons, the time period is “short” as compared to the 
Quiet Title Act.197  Putting to one side the arbitrariness of deciding what 
period is “short” versus “long”¾to say nothing about the open-ended 
invitation to judicial lawmaking such a rule would engender¾a 
comparison to the length of the Quiet Title Act’s limitations period loses its 
persuasive impact when we examine Congress’s intent with respect to the 
FTCA.  As we have said, both the one-year and six-month limitations 
periods in the original Act were applauded for being “short” because they 
protected the United States from having to defend stale claims.198  In 1966, 
Assistant Attorney General Douglas indicated that the six-month period 
represented an extension of the time within which an FTCA plaintiff could 
 
action within 6 months of notice by certified or registered mail of a final 
decision of the claim by the agency to which it was presented. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 196 See McNeil v. United States, 506 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1993) (“[G]iven the clarity of the 
statutory text, it is certainly not a ‘trap for the unwary.’”); Price v. United States, 69 F.3d 46, 
54 (5th Cir. 1995) (declining to apply equitable considerations to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) 
(1994) where the statutory command is “clear”), on reh’g, 81 F.3d 520 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 927 (1996); Jerves v. United States, 966 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(“‘The statutory procedure [outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)] is clear.’” (quoting Caton v. 
United States, 495 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1974))); Best Bearings Co. v. United States, 463 
F.2d 1177, 1179 (7th Cir. 1972) (“The language of § 2675(a) . . . is clear and unambiguous 
and phrased in mandatory terms.”); Meeker v. United States, 435 F.2d 1219, 1220 (8th Cir. 
1970) (same). 
 197 See Forman, 1999 WL 793429, at *9 (“The presumption favoring equitable tolling is 
stronger where the limitations period is short.”). 
 198 See H.R. REP. NO. 2428, supra note 108, at 5; 1940 Senate Hearings, supra note 108, 
at 11 (statement of Frank Murphy, Attorney General of the United States). 
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assert her rights against the United States.199  Therefore, assuming that the 
length of the limitations period has anything to do with whether equitable 
tolling is permissible¾a very questionable assumption in our 
view200¾there are strong legislative indications that the six-month 
limitations period was “short” for reasons other than opening the door to 
equitable tolling. 
The FTCA, then, provides a good example of how statutory 
comparisons often cause courts to stray from an inquiry into the intent 
behind the particular statute under review.  As the methodology endorsed 
by Beggerly and Brockamp  makes abundantly clear, the focus should 
always be on Congress’s intent with respect to the FTCA, and the FTCA 
alone. That intent, which is demonstrated throughout the Act’s legislative 
history, has been to lengthen the statutory periods themselves or to provide 
equitable tolling only in specifically limited circumstances.  It is irrelevant 
that the limitations periods Congress has chosen are deemed by the 
judiciary to be “short” or that the statutory language may be characterized 
as simple. 
Finally, a critic of the conclusions we reach here might mount an 
attack on two fronts.  First, the 1966 legislative history supports the view 
that equitable tolling is permissible because Congress intended FTCA 
plaintiffs to be treated more fairly and equitably when they sue the federal 
government.  Second, the purpose of encouraging the prompt presentation 
of claims against the United States is not inconsistent with the doctrine of 
equitable tolling because the doctrine is only invoked when a plaintiff has 
been diligent and when the United States has already been put on notice of 
the tort claim.201  Although these arguments are certainly not without some 
force, we ultimately reject them. 
Congress has itself prescribed the proper balance of fairness to 
claimants and fairness to the United States in defending tort claims.  As the 
legislative history reveals, Congress’s decision to change the statute of 
limitations three times since the Act was passed in 1946 demonstrates the 
 
 199 See 1966 Hearings, supra note 139, at 18. 
 200 See Parker & Colella, supra note 3, at 901 n.86 (arguing that judicial decision 
characterizing a limitations period as “generous” or “not generous enough” for purposes of 
equitable tolling analysis cannot be squared with canons of statutory construction in the 
waiver-of-sovereign-immunity context). 
 201 See, e.g., Hyatt v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 96, 101-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (“In short, 
the ‘obvious purpose’ of Section 2401(b), in encouraging prompt presentation of claims, is 
still served if equitable tolling is applied in this case.”).  We should point out, however, that 
Hyatt is probably no longer good law in the Second Circuit.  Hyatt’s premise was that Irwin 
rendered the FTCA’s limitations periods non-jurisdictional and therefore subject to 
equitable tolling.  See id. at 100-01.  The Second Circuit has since held that the FTCA’s 
time limitations are jurisdictional.  See Johnson v. Smithsonian Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 189 (2d 
Cir. 1999). 
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Congress’ concern that the balance struck in the statute of limitations 
remains fair.  This means that courts should not be allowed to upset this 
balance in the equitable tolling context, just like courts are precluded from 
doing so when other statute of limitations issues arise in FTCA cases.  For 
example, the United States is not permitted to benefit from more stringent 
statute of limitations rules prescribed in certain states,202 and FTCA 
plaintiffs are precluded from benefiting from more favorable state-law 
limitations rules.203  Courts do not permit the United States or plaintiffs to 
sidestep the FTCA’s statute of limitations out of respect for the balance that 
Congress has struck in fashioning the time limitations applicable to FTCA 
suits.204  We propose that courts pay the same respect in the equitable 
tolling context. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The question of whether the FTCA’s limitations periods could be 
equitably tolled after Beggerly and Brockamp  has been, and will continue 
to be, litigated.  The ultimate answer to the equitable tolling problem must 
come from the Supreme Court, which, in recent years, has shown an 
interest in more precisely defining the reach of Irwin.  It appears that it is 
only a matter of time before the Court will be faced with a case that 
squarely presents the issue of whether the FTCA is subject to equitable 
tolling.  In this regard, there already exists an inter-Circuit split on the issue 
of whether the Act’s limitations periods are jurisdictional,205 and there are 
 
 202 See, e.g., Bartleson v. United States, 96 F.3d 1270, 1276 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting 
government’s argument that state-law rule of accrual applied to FTCA claim because rule of 
accrual specified in FTCA applied); Johnston v. United States, 85 F.3d 217, 223-24 (5th Cir. 
1996) (rejecting government argument that wrongful death claim accrued pre-death because 
doing so would deprive FTCA claimants of the two-year period prescribed by Congress). 
 203 See, e.g., Pipkin v. United States Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 272, 274-75 (10th Cir. 1991) 
(rejecting FTCA plaintiff’s argument that state tolling statute applied to FTCA claim 
because doing so would upset balance struck by Congress). 
 204 See, e.g., Johnston, 85 F.3d at 220, 223-24 (declining to adopt state law in limitations 
analysis where to do so would upset congressional balance struck in FTCA’s statute of 
limitations); Pipkin, 951 F.2d at 275 (rejecting argument that state-law tolling provision 
would apply to toll six-month period because “[c]ourts are not free to construe section 
2401(b) so as to defeat that section’s purpose of encouraging prompt presentation of claims 
against the federal government”). 
 205 See Johnson v. Smithsonian Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that 
FTCA’s limitations periods are jurisdictional); Flory v. United States, 138 F.3d 157, 159 
(5th Cir. 1998) (same); Coska v. United States, 114 F.3d 319, 322 (1st Cir. 1997) (same); 
Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091 (3d Cir. 1995) (same); Goodhand v. United 
States, 40 F.3d 209, 214 (7th Cir. 1994) (same); Attallah v. United States, 955 F.2d 776, 779 
(1st Cir. 1992) (same); Bradley v. United States, 951 F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir. 1991) (same).  
But see Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913, 915-16 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the 
FTCA’s limitations periods are not jurisdictional); Kanar v. United States, 118 F.3d 527, 
530-31 (7th Cir. 1997) (same); Glarner v. United States Dep’t of Veterans Admin., 30 F.3d 
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at least three intra-Circuit splits on that precise question.206  Although, as 
we argued in our 1999 paper, the jurisdiction and equitable tolling issues 
are analytically distinct,207 courts nonetheless often combine the two in 
their discussion of the FTCA’s statute of limitations.  Therefore, by 
deciding the jurisdictional issue together with the equitable tolling 
question¾which is a virtual certainty in cases where compliance with the 
Act’s statute of limitations is raised as a bar to suit¾the Supreme Court or 
courts of appeals will have a number of opportunities to provide lower 
courts and litigants with additional guidance on how to resolve these 
important issues. 
We have weighed in on these questions twice.  And we have done so 
not out of some desire to get in the first word or to provide the United 
States a litigation weapon.  Rather, we have tried to provide courts with a 
complete picture of the FTCA’s statute of limitations and its legislative 
history, a history that is not readily accessible to courts, so that a decision 
on equitable tolling will be fully informed.  In charting what we believe to 
be the proper course, we have fielded the Beggerly-Brockamp  pitch and 
pulled together evidence from the text, purposes, and legislative history of 
the FTCA that sheds light on the question of whether equitable tolling is 
consistent with congressional intent. 
Unfortunately, after Beggerly and Brockamp , courts are not likely to 
 
697, 701 (6th Cir. 1994) (same); Krueger v. Saiki, 19 F.3d 1285, 1286 (8th Cir.) (same), 
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 905 (1994). 
 206 In the Fifth Circuit compare Perez, 167 F.3d at 915-16 (holding that the two-year 
limitations period is not jurisdictional) with Flory, 138 F.3d at 159 (holding that the FTCA’s 
two-year limitations period is jurisdictional) and Johnston, 85 F.3d at 218 n.2 (same) and 
M acMillan v. United States, 46 F.3d 377, 380 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995) (same). 
In the Sixth Circuit compare Miller v. United States Postal Serv., 995 F.2d 1067, 1993 
WL 64144, at *1 (6th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision) (holding that the FTCA’s 
limitations periods are jurisdictional), Willis v. United States, 972 F.2d 350, 1992 WL 
180181, at *2 (6th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision) (same), Horten v. United States, 
961 F.2d 1577, 1992 WL 102719, at *1 (6th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision) 
(affirming dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where plaintiff did not comply 
with FTCA’s two-year limitations period), with Glarner , 30 F.3d at 701 (holding that 
FTCA’s limitations periods are not jurisdictional). 
In the Seventh Circuit compare Kanar, 118 F.3d at 530-31 (opinion by Easterbrook, J.) 
(holding that the Act’s limitations periods are not jurisdictional), with Goodhand, 40 F.3d at 
214 (opinion by Posner, C.J.) (holding that the limitations periods in the FTCA are 
jurisdictional), and State Farm Ins. Co. v. United States, 6 F. Supp. 2d 985, 987 (N.D. Ill. 
1998) (same), and Burns v. United States Dept. of Justice, 864 F. Supp. 80, 81 (N.D. Ill. 
1994) (same), and Willis v. United States, 879 F. Supp. 889 (C.D. Ill. 1994), aff’d, 65 F.3d 
171 (7th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision) (Posner, C.J. & Easterbrook, J. on panel) 
(“We express no opinion on whether Irwin transformed the statute of limitations from a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to an affirmative defense . . . .”). 
 207 See Parker & Colella, supra note 3, at 898, 902-04 (reasoning that limitations periods 
can be jurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling). 
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find a clear statement from Congress that “equitable tolling is 
impermissible” or that “there shall be no equitable tolling.”  Indeed, there 
were no such statements in the history accompanying the statutes in 
Beggerly and Brockamp .  Such a statement from Congress would surely 
provide the simplest, most certain, and most legitimate answer to the 
Beggerly-Brockamp  question; however, this is not the case in the FTCA 
context.  For the textualist, the process of answering the equitable tolling 
question is sure to be an uncomfortable one.  Irwin uses a judicially-crafted 
presumption¾a dice-loading rule in Justice Scalia’s eyes208¾to speak for 
Congress in all waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statutes.  Perhaps it is time 
for the Court to reconsider the rebuttable -presumption rule altogether,209 or 
to limit the rule to waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statutes (like Title VII) 
that treat private parties and the United States the same for statute of 
limitations purposes.210  If the Court decides to limit Irwin in this way, such 
a decision would certainly shrink the ranks of “hapless law clerk[s],”211 and 
hapless trial attorneys for that matter, who must present legislative history 
as evidence that the presumption favoring equitable tolling has been 
rebutted. 
With that said, we have concluded that when Congress originally 
considered the limitations periods that should apply to tort claims brought 
against the United States, a number of prior bills contained equitable tolling 
provisions, but those provisions never made it into the Act as passed.  
Claimants were left, therefore, with a private bill of relief in inequitable 
circumstances.  Moreover, each time Congress amended the FTCA’s 
statute of limitations (in 1949, 1966, and again in 1988), equitable tolling 
was on the legislative table, and each time Congress either chose not to 
incorporate it into the Act, or did so by specifying the circumstances in 
 
 208 See SCALIA, supra note 51, at 28. 
 209 See, e.g., College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 
527 U.S. 666, 675-81 (1999) (overruling prior case that permitted constructive waiver of 
State’s sovereign immunity because implied waivers of sovereign immunity are invalid). 
 210 Compare Bailey v. West, 160 F.3d 1360, 1363-68 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (holding 
that Irwin’s rebuttable-presumption rule applies to time limit for appealing decision of 
Board of Veterans’ Appeals), with id. at 1369-70 (Michel, J., concurring) (holding that Irwin 
is “narrow” and interpreting Irwin as allowing equitable tolling only because equitable 
tolling was permitted in private Title VII suits), and id. at 1371 (Bryson, J., joined by 
Lourie, Rader & Schall, JJ., dissenting) (reasoning that Irwin did not control because “[t]he 
statutory procedure in [Title VII] cases involving government employees is essentially the 
same as the procedure in cases involving private employees, and the Court had previously 
held in private sector cases that the statutory time limits in Title VII are nonjurisdictional 
and thus subject to equitable tolling”). 
 211 See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 527 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I confess 
that I have not personally investigated the entire legislative historyor even that portion of 
it which relates to the four statutes listed above.  The excerpts I have examined and quoted 
were unearthed by a hapless law clerk to whom I assigned the task.”). 
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which the time periods would be extended.  At the same time, Congress has 
repeatedly expressed its intent to facilitate the prompt presentation of tort 
claims against the United States.  Thus, because Congress has historically 
assumed the role of modifying the FTCA’s limitations periods to cure 
inequities in its application, and because Congress has consistently 
highlighted the importance of timely compliance with the Act’s limitations 
periods, there is very good reason to believe that Congress did not want 
judicially crafted rules of equitable tolling to extend the FTCA’s limitations 
periods.  There is more than sufficient evidence in the legislative history to 
overcome any presumption that equitable tolling should apply to the 
FTCA’s limitations periods.  To ignore this legislative history or to 
discount its significance transforms Irwin’s rebuttable presumption into a 
conclusive presumption. 
Finally, our conclusion is fully consistent with a broader view of the 
historical relationship between Congress and Article III courts when it 
comes to tort compensation. The Act does not, and never did, replace the 
private-bill mechanism.  Since the passage of the FTCA, there are 
numerous examples of Congress entertaining private bills of relief when 
tort compensation could not be obtained in an Article III court.212  This 
 
 212 See, e.g., H.R. 998, 105th Cong. (1997) (private bill of relief for Lloyd B. Gamble, 
whose tort claim would have been barred by the FTCA’s statute of limitations); H.R. 1009, 
104th Cong. (1996) (same); H.R. 4862, 103d Cong. (1994) (private bill of relief for 
INSLAW, Inc., William A. Hamilton, and Nancy Hamilton, which would confer jurisdiction 
on the Court of Federal Claims to adjudicate the claim and waive jurisdictional defenses, 
such as statute of limitations); H.R. 3344, 103d Cong. (1994) (private bill of relief for Lloyd 
B. Gamble, whose tort claim would have been barred by the FTCA’s statute of limitations); 
H.R. 808, 103d Cong. (1993) (private bill of relief for James B. Stanley, whose tort claim 
was barred under the Feres doctrine in the case of United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 
(1987)); H.R. 572, 103d Cong. (1993) (private bill of relief for Melissa Johnson, whose tort 
claim was barred by the assault and battery exception of the FTCA); H.R. 5164, 102d Cong. 
(1992) (private bill of relief for Craig B. Sorensen and Nita M. Sorensen, whose tort claims 
would have barred under the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations); H.R. 455, 102d Cong. 
(1992) (private bill of relief for Melissa Johnson, whose tort claim was barred by the assault 
and battery exception of the FTCA); H.R. 2345, 102d Cong. (1992) (private bill of relief for 
William A. Kubrick, whose tort claim was held time-barred under the two-year limitations 
period in the case of United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979)); H.R. 1759, 102d Cong. 
(1992) (private bill of relief for James B. Stanley, whose tort claim was barred under the 
Feres doctrine in the case of United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987)); H.R. 760, 102d 
Cong. (1992) (private bill of relief for Willie D. Harris, whose tort claim would have been 
barred by the Feres doctrine and the FTCA’s statute of limitations, that would have 
permitted claimant to sue in federal court); H.R. 238, 102d Cong. (1991) (private bill of 
relief for Craig A. Klein, whose tort claim would have been barred by the customs exception 
in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)); H.R. 2937, 101st Cong. (1990) (private bill of relief for Rodney E. 
Hoover, whose claim would have been time-barred, that would have permitted Hoover to 
proceed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California); H.R. 4356, 
101st Cong. (1990) (private bill of relief for John Barren, whose tort claim was adjudicated 
to be time-barred under the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations in Barren ex rel. Barren 
v. United States, 839 F.2d 987 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 827 (1988)); H.R. 308, 101st 
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relationship between two co-equal branches of the federal government 
explains why the United States is unlike any other private tort defendant 
when it comes to equitable tolling.  Congress has enacted a limited waiver 
of sovereign immunity in tort, reserving for itself the responsibility of 
compensating those whose claims do not come within the strict waiver of 
immunity.  That necessarily includes those who do not comply with the 
Act’s limitations periods. 
 
Cong. (1990) (private bill of relief for Banfi Products Corp., whose tort claim was barred by 
the discretionary function exception, that would permit the Court of Claims to adjudicate the 
claim); S. 1077, 84th Cong. (1955) (private bill of relief to compensate victims of the Texas 
City Disaster, whose tort claims were barred by the discretionary function exception in 
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953)). 
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APPENDIX 
THE LIMITATIONS AND EQUITABLE TOLLING PROVISIONS OF LEGISLATIVE 
PROPOSALS CONSIDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE                      
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 
 
BILL NUMBER 
 
LIMITATIONS PERIODS EQUITABLE 
TOLLING 
 
H.R. 12178, 68th 
Cong. (Feb. 5, 1925) 
 
 
(1) One year for personal injury or 
death claims (§ 6) 
 
(2) No waiver of immunity for 
property damage claims 
 
 
None 
 
H.R. 12179, 68th 
Cong. (Feb. 5, 1925) 
 
 
(1) Two years for personal injury 
and death claims 
 
(2) No waiver of immunity for 
property damage claims 
 
 
None 
 
H.R. 6716, 69th Cong. 
(Jan. 5, 1926) 
 
 
(1) Six months for property 
damage  
(§ 2(c)) 
 
(2) Thirty days for personal injury  
(§ 202(c)) 
 
(3) Six months for wrongful death  
(§ 202(c)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) Time to file 
personal injury claims 
extended by six 
months if reasonable 
cause shown  
(§ 202(c)) 
 
(2) Period for minors 
under eighteen and 
incompetent 
does  
not begin to run until 
guardian or trustee 
obtained (§ 305) 
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H.R. 8914, 69th Cong. 
(Feb. 4, 1926) 
 
 
(1) Two years for personal injury 
or death claims (§ 5) 
 
(2) No waiver of immunity for 
property damage claims 
 
 
None 
 
S. 1912, 69th Cong. 
(Mar. 26, 1926) 
 
 
(1) Six months for property 
damage claims accruing prior to 
Act (§ 5) 
 
(2) Six years for property damage 
(§ 5) 
 
(3) Sixty days for personal injury  
(§ 202(a)) 
 
(4) Six months for wrongful death  
(§ 202(a)) 
 
(1) Time to file 
personal injury claims 
extended by six 
months if reasonable 
cause shown  
(§ 202(a)) 
 
(2) Period for minors 
under eighteen and 
incompetents does not 
begin to run until 
guardian or trustee 
obtained (§ 304) 
 
 
H.R. 9285, 70th Cong. 
(Jan. 13, 1928) 
 
 
(1) One year for property damage 
claims accruing prior to Act (§ 5) 
 
(2) Six years for property damage 
(§ 5) 
 
(3) Six months for personal injury  
(§ 202(a)) 
 
(4) One year for wrongful death  
(§ 202(a)) 
 
(1) Time to file 
personal injury claims 
extended by one year 
if reasonable cause 
shown (§ 202(a)) 
 
(2) Period for minors 
under twenty-one, 
idiots, lunatics, insane 
persons, and persons at 
sea extended one year 
from time disability 
ceases (§ 304) 
 
 
S. 4377, 71st Cong. 
(May 7, 1930) 
 
 
(1) Ninety days for property 
damage  
(§ 1(d)) 
 
(2) Ninety days for personal 
injury and wrongful death claims 
(§ 202(a)) 
 
(1) Time to file 
personal injury claims 
extended by one year 
if reasonable cause 
shown (§ 202(a)) 
 
(2) Period for minors 
under twenty-one, 
idiots, lunatics, insane 
persons, and persons at 
sea extended one year 
from time disability 
ceases (§ 304) 
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H.R. 15428, 71st 
Cong. (Dec. 18, 1930) 
 
 
(1) Ninety days for property 
damage  
(§ 1(d)) 
 
(2) Ninety days for personal 
injury and wrongful death claims 
(§ 202(a)) 
 
(1) Time to file 
personal injury claims 
extended by one year 
if reasonable cause 
shown (§ 202(a)) 
 
(2) Period for minors 
under twenty-one, 
idiots, lunatics, insane 
persons, and persons at 
sea extended one year 
from time disability 
ceases (§ 304) 
 
 
 
H.R. 16429, 71st 
Cong. (Jan. 21, 1931) 
 
 
(1) Ninety days for property 
damage (§ 2) 
 
(2) Ninety days for personal 
injury  
(§ 23(a)(1)) 
 
Period for minors 
under twenty-one, 
idiots, lunatics, insane 
persons, and persons at 
sea extended one year 
from time disability 
ceases (§ 304) 
 
 
H.R. 17168, 71st 
Cong. (Feb. 18, 1931) 
 
 
(1) Ninety days to file with 
agency for property damage claim 
under $1,000 (§ 2) 
 
(2) Ninety days for property 
damage claim over $1,000 filed in 
court (§ 2) 
 
(3) Ninety days to file in court 
after agency decision (§ 2) 
 
(4) One year to file with agency 
for personal injury or death claims 
under $1,000 (§ 202) 
 
(5) One year for personal injury or 
death claims over $1,000 (§ 202) 
 
(6) Ninety days to file in court 
after agency decision (§ 202) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
None 
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S. 211, 72d Cong. 
(Dec. 9, 1931) 
 
 
(1) Thirty days to file property 
damage claim with agency  
(§ 2(d)) 
 
(2) Thirty days to file personal 
injury and death claims with 
agency (§ 202(a)) 
 
(3) One year to file suit after 
agency decision (§ 303(2)) 
 
 
None 
 
H.R. 5065, 72d Cong. 
(Dec. 9, 1931) 
 
 
 
(1) Thirty days to file property 
damage claim with agency  
(§ 1(d)) 
 
(2) Thirty days to file personal 
injury or death claim with agency 
(§ 202(a)) 
 
(3) One year to file suit after 
agency decision (§ 303(2)) 
 
 
 
 
None 
 
S. 4567, 72d Cong. 
(May 4, 1932) 
 
 
 
(1) Thirty days to file property 
damage claim with agency  
(§ 2(c)) 
 
(2) Thirty days to file personal 
injury or death claim with agency 
(§ 202(a)) 
 
(3) One year to file suit after 
agency decision (§ 304(2)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) Notice of property 
damage claim timely if 
filed with agency 
within ninety days and 
reasonable cause and 
no prejudice to the 
United States shown  
(§ 2(c)) 
 
(2) Notice of personal 
injury or death claim 
timely if filed with 
agency within ninety 
days and reasonable 
cause and no prejudice 
to the United States 
shown (§ 202(a)) 
 
COLELLA FORMATTED.DOC  2/7/2001  11:41 AM 
224 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:174 
 
H.R. 129, 73d Cong. 
(March 9, 1933) 
 
 
(1) Two years to file all claims 
under $1,000 with agency (§ 2(e)) 
 
(2) Two years to file all claims 
over $1,000 in Court of Claims  
(§ 2(e)(1)) 
 
(3) Ninety days from agency 
denial, or, if 1 year passes without 
agency decision, 90 days after 
expiration of 1 year (§ 2(e)(2)) 
 
 
None 
 
S. 1833, 73d Cong. 
(May 29, 1933) 
 
 
(1) Thirty days to file property 
damage claim with agency  
(§ 1(b), (c)) 
 
(2) Thirty days to file personal 
injury or death claim with agency 
(§ 202(a), (b)) 
 
(3) If no agency action within 6 
months, suit may be filed  
(§ 304(1)) 
 
(4) One year to file suit after 
agency denial (§ 304(2)) 
 
 
(1) Notice of property 
damage claim timely if 
filed with agency 
within ninety days and 
reasonable cause and 
no prejudice to the 
United States shown  
(§ 1(c)) 
 
(2) Notice of personal 
injury or death claims 
timely if filed with 
agency within ninety 
days and reasonable 
cause and no prejudice 
to the United States 
shown (§ 202(a)) 
 
 
H.R. 8561, 73d Cong. 
(Mar. 9, 1934) 
 
 
 
 
Three years for all tort claims  
(§ 10) 
 
None 
 
H.R. 2028, 74th Cong. 
(Jan. 3, 1935) 
 
 
(1) Two years to file all claims 
under $1,000 with agency (§ 2(e)) 
 
(2) Two years to file all claims 
over $1,000 in Court of Claims  
(§ 2(e)(1)) 
 
(3) Ninety days from agency 
denial, or, if 1 year passes without 
agency decision, 90 days after 
expiration of 1 year (§ 2(e)(2)) 
 
 
None 
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S. 1043, 74th Cong. 
(Jan. 14, 1935) 
 
 
(1) Thirty days to file property 
damage claim with agency  
(§ 1(b), (c)) 
 
(2) Thirty days to file personal 
injury or death claim with agency 
(§ 202(a), (b)) 
 
(3) If no agency action within 6 
months, suit may be filed  
(§ 304(1)) 
 
(4) One year to file suit after 
agency denial (§ 304(2)) 
 
(1) Notice of property 
damage claim timely if 
filed with agency 
within ninety days and 
reasonable cause and 
no prejudice to the 
United States shown  
(§ 1(c)) 
 
(2) Notice of personal 
injury or death claims 
timely if filed with 
agency within ninety 
days and reasonable 
cause and no prejudice 
to the United States 
shown (§ 202(a)) 
 
 
H.R. 7236, 76th Cong. 
(July 14, 1939) 
 
 
(1) One year to file all claims 
under $1,000 with agency (§ 301) 
 
(2) One year to file suit for all 
claims over $1,000 (§ 301) 
 
(3) Six months to file suit after 
agency denial (§ 301) 
 
 
None 
 
S. 2690, 76th Cong.  
(June 24, 1939) 
 
 
(1) One year to file all claims 
under $1,000 with agency (§ 301) 
 
(2) One year to file suit for all 
claims over $1,000 (§ 301) 
 
(3) Six months to file suit after 
agency denial (§ 301) 
 
 
 
 
 
None 
 
H.R. 5185, 77th Cong. 
(June 26, 1941) 
 
One year to file all claims under 
$1,000 with agency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
None 
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H.R. 5299, 77th Cong. 
(July 14, 1941) 
 
 
(1) One year to file all claims 
under $1,000 with agency (§ 301) 
 
(2) One year to file suit for all 
claims over $1,000 (§ 301) 
 
(3) Six months to file suit after 
agency denial (§ 301) 
 
 
None 
 
S. 1743, 77th Cong. 
(July 14, 1941) 
 
 
(1) One year to file personal 
injury and property damage 
claims with agency 
 
(2) No provision for death claims 
 
 
None 
 
H.R. 5373, 77th Cong. 
(July 21, 1941) 
 
(1) One year to file all claims 
under $1,000 with agency (§ 301) 
 
(2) One year to file suit for all 
claims over $1,000 (§ 301) 
 
(3) Six months to file suit after 
agency denial (§ 301) 
 
(4) Six months to file suit after 
claim withdrawn from agency 
(§ 301) 
 
 
None 
 
S. 2207, 77th Cong. 
(Jan. 16, 1942) 
 
 
(1) One year to file all claims 
under $1,000 with agency (§ 401) 
 
(2) One year to file suit for all 
claims over $1,000 (§ 401) 
 
(3) Six months to file suit after 
agency denial (§ 401) 
 
(4) Six months to file suit after 
claim withdrawn from agency 
(§ 401) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
None 
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S. 2221, 77th Cong. 
(Jan. 23, 1942) 
 
 
(1) One year to file all claims 
under $1,000 with agency (§ 401) 
 
(2) One year to file suit for all 
claims over $1,000 (§ 401) 
 
(3) Six months to file suit after 
agency denial (§ 401) 
 
(4) Six months to file suit after 
claim withdrawn from agency (§ 
401) 
 
 
None 
 
H.R. 6463, 77th Cong. 
(Jan. 26, 1942) 
 
 
(1) One year to file all claims 
under $1,000 with agency (§ 401) 
 
(2) One year to file suit for all 
claims over $1,000 (§ 401) 
 
(3) Six months to file suit after 
agency denial (§ 401) 
 
(4) Six months to file suit after 
claim withdrawn from agency  
(§ 401) 
 
 
None 
 
H.R. 817, 78th Cong. 
(Jan. 7, 1943) 
 
 
(1) One year to file all claims 
under $1,000 with agency (§ 301) 
 
(2) One year to file suit for all 
claims over $1,000 (§ 301) 
 
(3) Six months to file suit after 
agency denial (§ 301) 
 
 
None 
 
H.R. 1356, 78th Cong. 
(Jan. 20, 1943) 
 
 
(1) One year to file all claims 
under $1,000 with agency (§ 401) 
 
(2) One year to file suit for all 
claims over $1,000 (§ 401) 
 
(3) Six months to file suit after 
agency denial (§ 401) 
 
(4) Six months to file suit after 
claim withdrawn from agency  
(§ 401) 
 
None 
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S. 1114, 78th Cong. 
(May 17, 1943) 
 
 
(1) One year to file all claims 
under $1,000 with agency (§ 401) 
 
(2) One year to file suit for all 
claims over $1,000 (§ 401) 
 
(3) Six months to file suit after 
agency denial (§ 401) 
 
(4) Six months to file suit after 
claim withdrawn from agency  
(§ 401) 
 
 
None 
 
H.R. 181, 79th Cong. 
(Jan. 3, 1945) 
 
 
(1) One year to file all claims 
under $1,000 with agency (§ 401) 
 
(2) One year to file suit for all 
claims over $1,000 (§ 401) 
 
(3) Six months to file suit after 
agency denial (§ 401) 
 
(4) Six months to file suit after 
claim withdrawn from agency  
(§ 401) 
 
 
None 
 
 
